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TOTAL FORCE TRAINING: A STUDY OF COMPANY-LEVEL
COMMANDERS' TRAINING IN AR. (U) ARMY COMMAND AND
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
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
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TOTAL FORCE TRAINING: A STUDY OF COMPANY-LEVEL COMMANDERS' TRAINING
IN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

AD-A164 724

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

LEE ROY BARNES, JR., MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1972

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ABSTRACT

Total Force Training: A Study of Company-Level Commanders' Training in Armored Cavalry Regiments in the Army National Guard, by Major Lee Roy Barnes, Jr., USA, 115 pages.

This study examines the professional training, including schooling, of the company-level ground maneuver combat unit commanders in the four armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) in the Army National Guard (ARNG). The focus is upon what these commanders have done, what they are required to do, and how well their training has prepared them for their peacetime and wartime missions.

The increased importance of the Reserve Components (RC) in our nation's deterrence and defense plans since the early 1970s has led to increased interest in the readiness and ability of the Army National Guard. Several programs developed to improve the RC's training and readiness posture directly affect the training of the company-level commanders in the ARNG's ACRs. This study discusses these programs and their impacts on the company-level commanders in the ARNG's ACRs.

Interviews were conducted to determine the training, including schooling, status of a sample population (twenty-five percent) of the armored cavalry troop and tank company commanders in the ARNG's ACRs. Conclusions drawn from the interview data include the following: The majority of ARNG ACR company-level commanders attended a resident officer basic course, even before the requirement to do so was established; however, the majority of these commanders have not completed the officer advanced course--the course that is designed to train them for company-level command; and many of these commanders are not making the fullest use of available external training assistance resources.

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CHAPTER ONE: RESERVE COMPONENTS IN THE TOTAL ARMY

The character of the United States Army has changed dramatically in the past two decades.¹ One of the most significant changes is the increased reliance placed upon the reserve forces of the United States by our national defense planners. This study will examine one facet of this increased reliance, specifically, the professional training and schooling of company-level commanders in the armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) of the Army National Guard.

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this study, the following definitions apply:

Active Army: The Regular Army and those personnel of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) serving on extended active duty tours in active Army positions.

Army National Guard: The Army National Guard of the United States, in its peacetime, nonfederalized role.

Total Army: The land combat arm of the Total Force, consisting of the active Army, the ARNG, and the USAR.

FOCUS OF THE STUDY

This study will examine the professional training and schooling of the company-level ground maneuver combat unit commanders in the armored cavalry regiments in the ARNG. There are four ACRs in the ARNG, each with nine armored cavalry troops and three tank companies. The training and schooling of these troop and company commanders will be examined in terms of what they have done, what they are required to do, and how well their training has prepared them for their training and wartime missions. Twelve troop and company commanders (25 per cent of the total number) will be used as the sample group.

This study concentrates on the ACRs for a number of reasons. First, my own experience has been in armor and armored cavalry units, and I recently served as an advisor to several ARNG armored cavalry units. Of greater significance, however, is the fact that armored cavalry units are the only ground maneuver combat units in the Army that are organically structured as combined arms units under their tables of organization and equipment (TOEs).

Tanks, cavalry fighting vehicles, and supporting indirect fire weapons, both mortar and artillery, are organic to the armored cavalry squadron in the ACR. Further, at the regimental level, attack helicopters are added to the structure. The necessity to effectively employ these different types of systems and units requires training that is more varied and demanding than that for a unit consisting primarily

of a single type of weapon or organization. Because of this broader training requirement, it is hoped that the results of this study will have a more general applicability than those of a more narrowly focused study.

IMPORTANCE OF THE ARNG COMPANY-LEVEL COMMANDER

My personal observations and the comments of my then-immediate supervisors have led me to conclude that the effectiveness of the training conducted in ARNG units is directly proportional to the skill and effectiveness of the company-level commander, more so than of any other individual.² The company level is where the actual day-to-day detailed training for soldiers is planned and supervised; it is also the first level to provide direct input to the readiness reporting system. Logistics support, administration, training status updates, and a myriad of other tasks occur at the company level, and the individual responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do is the company-level commander. He is the critical link in the ARNG's chain of command in preparing for war. He will be at least as critical if his unit is mobilized and committed. As General Donn A. Starry, then TRADOC Commander, pointed out in the 1981 Armor Conference keynote address:

The history of battle tells us that small units--battalions, squadrons, companies, troops, batteries--small units well-trained and well-led are more often than not what wins the battle....

Leadership is not a matter of administrative or managerial ability; on the battlefield, leadership is the ability to harness the courage of human beings into a concerted action in a most dangerous and complex undertaking.³

THE TOTAL FORCE

In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird initiated the force structure changes that led to the dramatically increased role now played by the ARNG. In a memorandum issued on 21 August 1970, he introduced the Total Force concept and he redefined the mobilization role of the reserve components, as follows:

Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces....Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.*

Secretary Laird amplified this concept in his Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces for Fiscal Year 1970:

Changing national strategy for the decade of the 1970s and beyond has caused an increase in the intensity of interest in the readiness and ability of the National Guard and Reserve. As we reduce the

size of the active armed forces and as we attempt to reduce costs of defense programs without decreasing the adequacy of our total military capability, we are placing increasing reliance and dependence on the Guard and Reserves as a combat ready part of the total force structure.*

The Total Force concept developed by Secretary Laird in the early 1970s continues to guide our strategic thinking today as we build our war plans around the combined capabilities of the active and reserve components. And, just as Secretary Laird said earlier, we continue to have an increased "intensity of interest" in the readiness and ability of our reserve forces. The Total Force concept has matured into a Total Force policy at the same time that our plans and systems for improving the integration of active and reserve forces have matured.

This major change in our strategic thinking, which moved the reserve forces from the strategic reserve category to that of forces capable of rapid mobilization and deployment, was not undertaken with the express purpose of improving or upgrading our defense capabilities. Instead, the driving consideration was the budget. Indeed, the first sentence of Secretary Laird's aforementioned memorandum stated: "The President has requested reduced expenditures during Fiscal Year 1971 and extension of these economies into future budgets."* The economic advantages provided by the reserve forces in the form of reduced expenditures as compared to those of the active forces are still sought by our nation's planners; thus, the increased reliance on the reserve forces will continue in the foreseeable future.*

The reduction of the defense budget often means an increased role

and more or expanded missions for the reserve forces. However, the task of increasing their readiness from its poor state in 1970 to that of a force capable of rapid mobilization and deployment could not be accomplished with a simple administrative announcement. Major force structure changes for the reserve forces, including an overall increase in their size (over pre-Vietnam levels), dramatic increases in both the quantity and quality of their equipment, and improvements in their level of training, are significant efforts that have been vigorously pursued in recent years.

Major General Herbert R. Temple, the current Director of the Army National Guard, sums up the changed ARNG role this way:

Our mission remains clear: the Army National Guard must be manned, trained and equipped to fight and win. The demands of the present-day threat have erased the comfortable cushion that once served to afford Guardsmen months to prepare for the rigors of battle. Mobilization will not allow for months or weeks of preparation. Guardsmen must be ready today!*

THE ARNG IN THE TOTAL ARMY

The importance of the ARNG to the Total Army is clearly shown by the fact that the ARNG provides more than one-third of the combat divisions; more than one-half of the infantry battalions, armored cavalry regiments, and field artillery battalions; almost one-half of the armor and mechanized infantry battalions; and almost one-third of the aviation units of the Total Army.* These forces include the five

roundout brigades and seven roundout battalions for the active force.¹⁰ In addition, current mobilization plans require the deployment of many ARNG units earlier than many continental United States (CONUS)-based active Army units to reinforce forward deployed and contingency forces.

Three significant characteristics of the Army National Guard have not changed, in spite of the ARNG's expanded role in the Total Army. First, the ARNG remains primarily a state-controlled force, under the day-to-day command of the state adjutants general (who are responsible to their respective governors). Second, the vast majority of the ARNG is composed of individuals who have a vested interest in their civilian career or profession, and this aspect of the ARNG must be taken into consideration for any given training plan.¹¹ Third, the ARNG is still basically limited to 39 training days per individual per year.¹²

The concept of state control over the ARNG has been under attack from various quarters over the years, but it has survived basically intact. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the "increase in the intensity of interest in the readiness and ability" of the National Guard has breathed new life into some attempts at increased federal control over the ARNG.

The topic of the conflicting time demands of two different professions will be addressed in this study. However, a complete examination of this topic is beyond the scope of and will not be attempted in this study.

The 39-day training year is also undergoing scrutiny by many

would-be reformers. A recent Army Times article stated that the Reserve Forces Policy Board, in its FY '83 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, recommended that the annual active duty training authorization be increased by at least seven days. This additional time would be used to conduct small unit training that the Board said could not be accomplished under the present training days authorization.¹³

Chapters 2 and 3 will discuss the programs and systems that have been developed to attempt to increase significantly the effectiveness of the training that occurs in the authorized 39 days of training. Additionally, the adequacy of 39 days a year to conduct leader training in units will be discussed in Chapter 3.

SUMMARY

Since 1970, the Army National Guard's mission has included a new early commitment thrust; however, no additional pre-mobilization training time has been authorized to compensate for the new shorter post-mobilization training time. The increased "intensity of interest" in the readiness of the ARNG has caused several characteristics of the ARNG to either be changed recently or to come under close scrutiny for possible change in the near future.

The keystones in the ARNG's training are the company-level commanders. They must be trained to lead and to train their units in peacetime (as well as in wartime). Their skill and effectiveness in

training their units will be significant factors in determining whether or not the ARNG can meet the increased level of reliance and corresponding increased level of demands made on it.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

¹Some of the major changes in the Army since the early 1970s have been a strength reduction of approximately 500,000 soldiers from the Vietnam-era active force strength level; a transition from a committed force to a peacetime force; abolition of the draft and replacement by an all-volunteer system; a major upgrade in the pay scales across the board; disestablishment of the Women's Army Corps, and the subsequent opening of many nontraditional jobs to women soldiers; and the development of the concept and follow-on policy of a Total Force. According to this concept, the active and reserve components of the Army are viewed and managed as components of the Total Army, not as separate entities.

²One possible exception to the assertion that the company-level commander is the key link in the ARNG training chain of command will be discussed. That exception is that if either the Full-Time Training Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) or the Unit Administrator is a very strong-willed, capable individual, he can often plan around and compensate for (to one degree or another) an ineffective company-level commander. Conversely, ineffective unit FTM personnel in either of the aforementioned positions can undermine the effectiveness of the unit commander. The Full-Time Manning Program will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 2.

³General Donn A. Starry, "[Armor Conference] Keynote Address." Armor 40 (July-August 1981): p. 36.

⁴Memorandum, Laird to Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al. Subject: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces, 21 August 1970. (Cited hereafter as Memorandum, Laird to Secretaries.)

⁵U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces for Fiscal Year 1970 (24 February 1971): p. 1.

⁶Memorandum, Laird to Secretaries: p. 1.

⁷U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1985 Budget, FY 1986 Authorization Request, and FY 1985-89 Defense Programs, February 1, 1984 (1 February 1984): p. 114. (Cited hereafter as Report.)

⁸Major General Herbert R. Temple, "Today's Guard Must be Ready to Fight." Army 33 (October 1983): p. 118.

⁹George J. Stein, "State Defense Forces: The Missing Link in National Security." Military Review 64 (September 1984): p. 7.

¹⁰Major General Herbert R. Temple, "Vitalized Guard Gives the Nation Strong 'Return on Investment,'" Army 34 (October 1984): p. 178. (Cited hereafter as *Investment*.)

"Some individuals do serve in full-time ARNG support positions, but the vast majority of National Guard soldiers have civilian jobs as their principal employment. The Full-Time Manning Program will be discussed in Chapter 2.

¹²The ARNG is authorized 39 days per year for training, while the USAR is authorized 38 days per year (U.S. Department of the Army, AR 350-1, Army Training (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 August 1981): para 6-1). (Cited hereafter as AR 350-1.)

¹³Larry Carney, "Increase Urged in Guard, Reserve Training," Army Times, 10 December 1984: p. 9. The Reserve Forces Policy Board acts through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) as the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components (RCs). Its members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense and by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and include Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments, members of the Regular Army, and 15 RC officers, including one RC officer who is a general or flag officer. This board usually meets four times per year. (Department of Defense, DOD Directive, number 5102.2, with change 1, subject: Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 October 1973): pp. 1-4.)

CHAPTER TWO: A LOOK AT THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

To develop some appreciation for the training environment in the ARNG, this chapter will introduce several key topics that have a direct relationship with and impact upon this study. These topics include the Total Army concept, the Full-Time Manning program, and prevailing attitudes in and towards the ARNG.

THE TOTAL ARMY

According to The Department of the Army Manual, "The 'Total Army' isn't new. It's as old as our nation."¹ In one sense, this statement is true. Historically, the Militia (after 1916, the National Guard) has been used to bolster the ranks of the active Army in times of conflict.² Moreover, the Army Reserve (then the Organized Reserves) was established by the National Defense Act of 1916 to provide a source of trained manpower to augment the active Army.³ The Guard and Reserve continue today to provide the augmentation forces for the active Army.

However, in another, perhaps larger, sense, the statement from the Manual may not be precisely correct. The issue of the purpose and control of the Militia (Army National Guard) is very much alive today,

and has a very real impact on the structure of the Total Army and the relationships between the active component and the ARNG. It is not the intent of this study to debate the role of the active Army and its agents in the conduct of the training and the administration of the Army National Guard, but it is important to note the source of one of the current relevant issues. Thus, it is appropriate here to review briefly the military aspect of the historical issue of states' rights.

As early as the Constitutional debates of the late 1700s, one of the major issues was that of states' rights. The military clauses of the Constitution of the United States show that the attitudes against a too-powerful central government prevailed--especially with regard to large standing armies. The Constitution makes the following provisions relating to the Army and the Militia:

Article I, Section 8: The Congress shall have Power...To raise and support Armies...To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress....⁴

Article II, Section 2: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States....⁵

As these extracts show, the Constitutional separation of state and

federal rights concerning the armed forces is clear. Thus, the concept of a Total Army, referred to in The Department of the Army Manual, does not appear to be "as old as our Nation," and, indeed, appears to conflict with the Constitution.

Historian John K. Mahon has written about the early discussions on the roles of the Militia and the standing forces and how these discussions contributed to the final wording of the Constitution.

Mahon's work, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789-1800, details the propositions of such notables as George Washington, Henry Knox, Baron Von Steuben, and Alexander Hamilton. Pre- and post-Constitutional debates produced decisions that the Army was a necessary evil, that it should remain small, and that the Militia was to be a separate military organization, to be called up for federal service when needed, but definitely a state asset.⁶

George Washington had addressed the issue of uniformity among the state militias in his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," written 2 May 1783, to Alexander Hamilton, chairman of the Committee of the Congress on the Peace Establishment. In his paper, Washington called for establishing "A well organized Militia; upon a Plan that will pervade all the States, and introduce similarity in their Establishment Maneuvers. Exercise and Arms."⁷ He also went on record as an early proponent for the national strategy that would later be known as credible deterrence.

I come next in the order I have prescribed myself,
to treat of the Arrangements necessary for placing

the Militia of the Continent on a respectable footing for the defense of the Empire...being persuaded, that the immediate safety and future tranquility of this extensive Continent depend in a great measure upon the peace Establishment now in contemplation; and being convinced at the same time, that the only probable means of preventing insult or hostility for any length of time and from being exempted from the consequent calamities of War, is to put the National Militia in such a condition as that they may appear truly respectable in the Eyes of our Friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies.⁹

General Washington warned of the consequences of not insuring uniformity and discipline in the Militia. In another document, he wrote: "To place dependence on [ill-regulated] militia is assuredly resting on a broken staff."¹⁰ However, this warning went unheeded, and the final wording of the Constitution included no requirement for uniformity among the militias.¹¹

Nonetheless, a number of gradual increases in federal control over the National Guard have occurred since the signing of the Constitution. In 1792, four years after the Constitution went into effect, Congress passed "An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National Defense by Establishing an Uniform Militia Throughout the United States" (also known as the Uniform Militia Act). Among other provisions, the Act established the adjutant general position in each state, and provided a basic structure for the states' militias, requiring each to be organized into brigades and regiments "if the same be convenient." Furthermore, the Act required the state adjutants general to report yearly to the President, as well as to their respective governors, as to the status of

their state militias. However, this Act, which was to remain the governing militia act until 1903, provided no penalties for noncompliance, and the provisions for militia structure were largely ignored.¹¹

Little further was done to alter the relationship between the federal government and the militia until 22 April 1898, three days before Congress declared war on Spain. On this date, Congress passed the Volunteer Bill, which enabled the National Guard, with the respective governors' permission, to volunteer as units to fight in the Spanish-American War. This Bill provided the legal basis for the U.S. to commit the states' militias outside the continental United States.¹²

In 1902, Secretary of War Elihu Root recommended a number of reforms of the nation's defense structure. One of these reforms revamped the Uniform Militia Act, recommending an improved organization that would link the National Guard and the Regular Army more closely together, in order to "bring the [National Guard's] training program, organization, and equipment in line with that of the Regular Army."¹³ A slightly modified version of this proposal, commonly referred to as the Dick Act, was passed in 1903.¹⁴

The Dick Act established a Division of Militia Affairs in the War Department, but included no provision for National Guard officers to serve on this Division's staff. The Dick Act also directed that, during an emergency, the National Guard be called into federal service ahead of a volunteer unit. However, once the National Guard was called up, it

was to become a pool of individual replacements for the Army; no provisions were made to employ the National Guard as distinct units.¹³

In 1916, Congress passed the National Defense Act, which established the first organized general purpose federal reserve forces: an Officers Reserve Corps, an Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve Officers Training Corps. The National Guard had long resisted this move, but the manpower demands of America's imminent involvement in the war in Europe (World War I) overrode the National Guard's concerns. The National Defense Act also doubled the required training periods (drills) to 48, tripled the required number of days of Annual Training to 15, and allowed the President to assign Regular Army officers and noncommissioned officers to National Guard units without a request from the governors. Additionally, the National Defense Act redesignated the Division of Militia Affairs as the Militia Bureau, moved the Bureau under the direct control of the Secretary of War, and authorized positions for two National Guard officers on the Bureau's staff.¹⁴

The National Defense Act of 1920 amended the National Defense Act of 1916. The changes included establishing the Army of the United States and listing its three components: the Regular Army, the Organized Reserves, and the National Guard. The 1920 Act also changed the position of the Chief of the Militia Bureau to a National Guard officer's position, and moved the Militia Bureau under the direct supervision of an assistant secretary of war. Under the Act, the Regular Army picked up the additional peacetime duty of supervising the training of the

reserve forces.¹⁷

A further amendment of the National Defense Act of 1916 occurred in 1933. The gist of this amendment was to streamline the call-up procedure, eliminating the need to first disband National Guard units and then draft their personnel as individual replacements. Additionally, the Militia Bureau was redesignated the National Guard Bureau.¹⁸

The National Guard's contributions during World War II, while significant to the war effort, have little bearing on and will not be discussed in this study. The most significant policy change relevant to this study to come out of World War II occurred in October 1945, when Secretary of War Stimson issued policies that allowed the federal government to supervise military instruction and to furnish field training facilities, pay, uniforms, equipment, and ammunition for the National Guard.¹⁹ Although many minor changes have subsequently been made, these basic policies remain in effect today.

The last major attempt to fully merge the ARNG into the Army structure occurred shortly after World War II. In 1947, Secretary of Defense Forrestall appointed a board, named after its chairman, Gordon Gray, to examine the reserves and recommend their most suitable role(s). The Gray Board reported that the National Guard system, with its inherent dual loyalty to both the state and the federal government, could not enhance national security. The Gray Board recommended the merger of the National Guard into the Organized Reserves, and Secretary

Forrestall concurred. However, the ARNG (through the lobbying efforts of the National Guard Association (NGA) and a campaign in the NGA's magazine, The National Guardsman) used the historical arguments--based on states' rights--against such a merger to successfully persuade Congress to maintain the status quo.²⁰

Nonetheless, the issue of control of the ARNG has by no means been fully resolved. An example of the sensitivity Congress, the Army, and the National Guard maintain towards this issue is found in the report on the 1983 hearings on Full-Time Support held by the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. In the 8 June 1983 subcommittee hearing, Representative Jamie L. Whitten, Democrat from Mississippi, Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, made the following observation:

I came to Congress in 1943....[I]n the years I have been here, it has been the Guard and the Reserves that has [sic] maintained public support for the military. We have constantly to watch to see that they are not moved in on by the regular forces. And I think that is historically true.²¹

Lieutenant General Emmett H. Walker, Jr., Chief of the National Guard Bureau, was one of the witnesses that day. In his summary statement, he said:

One of the burning questions we have out there today, sir, is State versus Federal control. The National Guard Bureau has felt from the very beginning of this [Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)] program that it was the Congress' intention that the AGR serving under Title 32 [of the U.S. Code] be under control of the States.

I am sure you are aware that the Judge Advocate

General of the Army and the General Counsel of the Army, in their interpretation of the statutes, have ruled that Title 32 AGR personnel are on Federal active duty and not under the control of the State. We believe that this needs to be clarified....

The two burning issues we have out there are, one, the clarification of the State versus Federal control, and the other is that we must have a stable environment with continuing growth, without constantly changing instructions.²²

Representative J. Kenneth Robinson, Republican from Virginia, added his concern when he commented on a letter he had received from the Adjutant General of Virginia, Major General Kastles, in which the latter deplored the lack of firm, consistent direction in the AGR program. Representative Robinson said:

I wonder, hearing that from Virginia, where the National Guard has always been a very significant asset, where the morale has customarily been very high, and sensing an attitude that is represented there by General Kastles, to what degree you sense that this is affecting the morale of the Guard as a whole.

I sense a fragmentation of the Guard from state-to-state [sic], and a deterioration of the morale that comes from the knowledge of knowing that it is a state-oriented asset, it is a state-oriented military asset, which is now being directed to a degree from Washington [,D.C.,] and that is viewed as unhealthy and unwise.²³

Discussions of state versus federal control and of methods to insure that the will of Congress is enforced continued throughout this hearing. The Army's position, based upon the rulings of its General Counsel and its Judge Advocate General, cited above, was that the Army controlled the personnel in the AGR program. This view was not shared

by the National Guard Bureau representatives or by a number of the subcommittee members.

The final appropriations bill (the subject of the hearings cited above) was passed by Congress on 24 September 1983. Sections 502 and 504 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act stated that AGR personnel serving under Title 32 of the U.S. Code were under the command and control of their respective state authorities.²⁴

Obviously, the issue of state versus federal control impacts on the relationships between the Army and the ARNG. The trend over the past two centuries has clearly been towards greater federal control over the state forces. Recent actions in this regard include Secretary of Defense Laird's 1970 announcement of the Total Force concept, which he refined into the Total Force policy in 1973, and the Army's attempted control of the AGR program.²⁵ However, it is clear that the relationship between the active Army and the ARNG will not be that of a chain of command, but will remain advisory in nature unless there is a definitive change in Congressional guidance concerning the matter of state versus federal control of the ARNG.²⁶

The Total Army, then, is composed of three parts: the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Army Reserve.²⁷ The Total Army has evolved over the past two centuries from two distinct organizations: the Army and the Militia. Within the Total Army structure, and at the highest levels of the federal government, there remains an acknowledged distinction between the Regular Army's

primary role and the primarily state-oriented role of the ARNG.

FULL-TIME MANNING

The day-to-day work of the Army is closely paralleled in the ARNG. The troops are not present in the ARNG (during nontraining periods), but the administration, logistics, and training preparation must still be accomplished in order to maintain a relatively high state of readiness. Historically, the daily tasks of the ARNG have been performed primarily by the ARNG military technician (MT) force. The MT force traces its history to the horse caretakers of the early Militia regiments. This caretaker force grew, at state expense, until 1956 when the government began to fund "caretakers and clerks."²⁸ In 1969, the federal government granted MTs full civil service status.²⁹

One recently developed major program designed to increase the readiness of the ARNG is the Full-Time Manning (FTM) program. The FTM program is designed to supplement--not replace--the MT program.³⁰

Army Regulation (AR) 135-2, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Full-Time Manning, states the FTM program's objectives are to:

Provide full-time personnel and skills to enhance readiness through improved training, administration, personnel, maintenance, supply, and operational activities[, and to] improve unit readiness, and mobilization or deployment planning and preparation to a level that provides an adequate assurance of unit response time and capability."³¹

FTM personnel are assigned against unit modified tables of

organization and equipment (MTOE) positions.³² These individuals belong to the unit; they are not advisors.³³ Personnel serving in FTM positions authorized under AR 135-2 are either Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), Full-Time Support (FTS), or Active Component (AC) personnel. FTM AGR personnel are National Guardsmen and Army Reservists on full-time active duty in FTM positions working solely in support of the FTM program. FTS personnel are civilians who work on a full-time basis in support of the FTM program; they do not deploy with the units they support. FTM AC personnel are Regular Army and reserve components personnel (the latter on extended active duty) serving in support of the FTM program.³⁴ (The terms "full-time active duty" and "extended active duty" refer to differently funded programs, both of which provide authorizations for full-time active service for RC personnel.)

FTM personnel provide the daily continuity necessary for the unit's administrative, logistical, and training support performing necessary activities between Inactive Duty Training (IDT) drills to insure productive training during drills. The research for this study did not produce a single view opposed to the FTM concept. Many different views were presented about which is the most effective group of support personnel (AGR, FTS, or AC), but all comments concerning the FTM program recognized the need for some type of continuous support in ARNG units.³⁵ An indicator of the perceived effectiveness of the FTM program is its anticipated growth rate through 1988. According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the program will increase by more than 50% in the

next four years "in order to bring combat readiness to required levels."³⁶

One position established in the ARNG ACRs under the FTM program is that of Company/Troop Training NCO. This position provides the unit commander with an additional full-time assistant who augments the Unit Administrator and any other full-time personnel in the unit.

As an advisor and branch assistance team chief, I observed training preparation both before and after the establishment of the FTM training NCO positions. Prior to the time these positions were filled, the level of training preparation in most of the company-level units I advised or assisted was usually less than adequate. After the training NCOs had been in place long enough to know their job (usually 1-2 months), this was no longer the case, and most of the units I worked with were fairly well-prepared to conduct their scheduled training.

Much of what a company-level unit does or fails to do, especially during IDT drills, often depends on how well the FTM personnel do their jobs between drills. The commander is responsible for the unit's performance, but the unit's FTM personnel are the training mainstays for the unit between drills. The FTM personnel selection system is described in AR 135-2; FTM personnel are trained at the National Guard Professional Education Center (NGPEC) to insure that they are fully qualified for their duty positions."³⁷

ATTITUDES IN THE ARNG

The final factor in the ARNG training environment that this chapter will discuss is attitude, both within and outside of the ARNG.

Attitudes are important in training—willing students and professional (and competent) trainers are necessary ingredients for any type of training. This combination is especially critical in the ARNG, due to the limited availability of training time and, often, the lack of equipment to train with.³⁸

The attitude inside the ARNG has changed fundamentally in recent years. The ARNG is a critical component in our deterrence and defense plans, and this fact has been stressed repeatedly by our nation's key defense officials. Moreover, these same officials have backed their words with actions. Along with the structure changes of the mid-and late 1970s, most units were aligned with a CAPSTONE headquarters, beginning in the early 1980s. Under the CAPSTONE program, ARNG units are encouraged to train with the units they are scheduled to fight with, and they are given a real-world mission to train for. Furthermore, many ARNG units have been identified as Roundout units, and these units are integral components of—not additions to—the active Army units they are affiliated with.³⁹

In addition to the CAPSTONE program, several other programs have been developed to stimulate the Total Force policy, including the Key Personnel Upgrade program (KPUP), the Captains-to-Europe program, and the refinement of the CONUS training base command and control structure.

Part of the latter included the refinement of the role the Continental United States Armies (CONUSA) play in ARNG training and mobilization, and the establishment of U.S. Army Readiness Groups to provide training and mobilization assistance to ARNG and USAR units. The end result of these developments is that the ARNG has been shown through actions, not just words, that its role in our national defense has expanded. One of the responses of the ARNG's members to this expanded role has been an improved professional attitude.

A comment by then-Major General John R. Galvin, Jr., highlights one example of this demonstrated increased professional attitude inside the ARNG. In discussing the participation of a Roundout unit (the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) of the Georgia ARNG) in Exercise BOLD EAGLE 82, he said:

Now that I've seen their headquarters in the field during BOLD EAGLE I am thoroughly convinced that these people are true professionals....They performed extremely well. There was very little difference between the performance of the 48th and the active Army brigade working alongside of them.
**

Since 1970, the Army has dramatically changed the way it conducts training, with the introduction of the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS), the Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs), and Soldier's Manuals. Basically, the BTMS provides guidelines for planning and conducting training; the ARTEPs list combat critical tasks, the conditions these tasks must be executed under, and the required standards of performance; and the Soldier's Manuals provide the tasks, conditions, and standards for skill levels (related to grade and

position) for each military occupational specialty (MOS). The introduction of the BTMS, ARTEPs, and Soldier's Manuals has also served to improve the company-level training environment in the ARNG; BTMS provide these units detailed guidance, and the ARTEPs and Soldier's Manuals tell them what is to be trained, under what conditions, and to what standard. This refined training system, coupled with the real-world mission and training guidance provided by the CAPSTONE headquarters, has dramatically changed the ARNG company-level training environment from that of pre-1970.

In 1984, Major General (Ret.) William E. Ingram, then-President of the National Guard Association of the United States, summed up this new training environment, saying:

A retired Guardsman of just five years [sic] probably would not recognize the National Guard today. We are being equipped with the most sophisticated and modern weapons systems available and manned by increasing numbers of full-time Guardsmen. Guard units are training longer, more often, on mission-oriented tasks at prime training sites both overseas and around the continental United States (CONUS). The National Guard has become an important part of the Total Force policy.⁴⁴

The attitudes outside the ARNG are important to the training atmosphere, for two reasons. First, the attitudes outside the ARNG are, in the aggregate, public opinion—often a determining factor with regard to appropriations. Strong negative public opinion could hamper the appropriations for many worthwhile programs, thus retarding still necessary improvements in the ARNG. Conversely, the lack of strong

negative public opinion (not necessarily indicating strong positive public opinion) would not tend to have the same adverse effect.

Second, future ARNG enlistments will reflect the attitudes outside the ARNG. A statement made by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Arthur S. Collins, in his book Common Sense Training, sums up this aspect:

Active duty personnel tend to think that the problems of the Reserve Components and the Active Army are similar, but they are so only up to a point. One major difference is the company commander's time-consuming responsibility to recruit in his community, an essential ingredient in maintaining the strength of his unit.*²

The harder a commander has to work to overcome adverse public opinion to meet his recruitment goals (and his retention goals), the less time and energy he will have to devote to training or to getting trained himself. The ARNG has manning problems that differ from those of the active Army, in that ARNG units' members come from local communities; if a unit cannot attract members from the local community, that unit operates and trains at less than full strength. My personal observations and several conversations I have had with ARNG officers on this topic lead me to believe that, in practice, strength maintenance, especially recruiting, is accorded a higher priority than training is accorded. Thus, a company-level commander, if forced to choose between using his limited authorized training time maintaining his unit's strength level or training his unit and himself, may well choose the former over the latter, even though he may be a very conscientious trainer and training manager.

PUBLIC OPINION OF THE ARNG

The ARNG had a poor reputation to overcome in the mid-1970s, due to a combination of factors which are beyond the scope of this study.^{**} However, with the increased role of the ARNG in the Total Army, the attitude outside the ARNG can be expected to be increasingly linked with public opinion of the active Army. Recently, the active Army has been touting the improvement in the quality of its new recruits. The same improvement is found in today's ARNG recruits--more with high school diplomas, and fewer in Mental Category IV--indicating an improving attitude towards the ARNG (as well as the active Army).^{**}

An example of a commonly held attitude, both positive and negative, towards the ARNG is the letter printed in the February 1985 issue of Military Review. Writing in response to a previously published article about training problems encountered by the ARNG due to its restricted training days allocation, Colonel (Ret.) Irving Heymont states:

The notion that our voluntary Army Reserve system can [, in 38 or 39 days training per year,] produce acceptably ready units of all types on mobilization flies in the face of experience and logic. In the four mobilizations of Army Reserve components since World War I, it was necessary to conduct, at the minimum, a full program of unit (collective) training after mobilization. Improvements in the Reserve system since World War II have greatly reduced the requirements for post-mobilization individual training but little more. The field tests of the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Reserve Component Test Program [conducted in the early 1970s] showed that the best to be expected in peacetime was company-level training proficiency and that only with extensive (and expensive) Active Army support....The Total Force concept has a wonderful sound;

however, it is a hollow sound if reservists, regardless of their dedication, are expected to do what is not possible."¹⁵

As already discussed, a number of efforts have been undertaken to make the Total Force concept's sound a solid one, rather than a "hollow" one. The Total Force concept has been matured into the Total Force policy, and this policy has resulted in several new and refined programs and systems designed to insure the land component of the Total Force--the Total Army--operates on a sound foundation of a well-integrated active Army/ARNG/USAR structure.

SUMMARY

The training environment in the ARNG has changed dramatically in the recent past. At the company level, the CAPSTONE program, the recently revised Army training system, and the FTM program, have been largely responsible for this major change. For the company-level commanders in the ARNG ACRs (as well as in the remainder of the ARNG units) this changed training environment has refined the training structure in the ARNG, given the commanders real-world missions to train for, and established the tasks, conditions, and standards for this training. Complementing this change in the training environment are the changes in the attitudes within the ARNG and outside the ARNG; Guardsmen are more professional than they were in recent past, and they are generally recognized as being such by non-Guardsmen.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

¹U.S. Department of the Army. The Department of the Army Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1982): p. 1-7. (Cited hereafter as Manual.)

²The date of the name change varies between sources, since the names "National Guard," "Organized Militia," and "Militia" were frequently used interchangeably, even in official documents. The Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act) recognized the National Guard as the Organized Militia, and "sought to bring its training program, organization, and equipment in line with that of the Regular Army" (Manual: p. 5-11). The date cited here (1916) is found in Colonel (Ret.) R. Ernest Dupuy's book, The Compact History of the United States Army, 2d ed. (New York: Hawthorne Books, November 1956): p. 220.

³John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983): p. 148. (Cited hereafter as Militia.) According to this source, the initial formation of the Army Reserve only provided for individual, not unit, augmentation to the Army.

⁴Henry Steele Commager, ed. Documents of American History (New York: Meredith Pub. Co., 1963): p. 141.

⁵Ibid., p. 143.

⁶John K. Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789-1800 (University of Florida Monographs, Spring 1960): pp. 7, 18-21. (Cited hereafter as American Militia.)

⁷Russell F. Weigley, ed. The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society (Menlo Park, CA.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1969): p. 3. (Cited hereafter as Readings.)

⁸Ibid., p. 5.

⁹American Militia: p. 5.

¹⁰General Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and other Federalists, proposed forming a federally-controlled militia corps, organized without reference to state lines. This corps would provide uniformity to the Militia in training, service, and equipment. The differences of opinion cited here were the military aspects of the larger differences between the Federalists (Hamilton, et al.) and the Anti-Federalists (under

Thomas Jefferson's leadership). For a further discussion of this subject, see Russell F. Weigley's book, History of the United States Army, (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1967), pp. 74-143. See also Edward Meade Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundation of Military Power," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1943): pp. 128-138.

¹¹"Militia: p. 52.

¹²American Militia: pp. 126 and 127, and Manual: p. 5-8.

¹³Ibid., p. 5-11.

¹⁴The bill is known as the Dick Act due to Ohio Congressman Charles Dick's efforts to insure its passage. At that time, Congressman Dick was also a major general in the Ohio National Guard (and was designated as the Commander--not the Adjutant General--of the Ohio National Guard), the president of the National Guard Association, and the chairman of the House Committee on the Militia.

¹⁵Militia: pp. 140 and 143.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 148-149.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 171. See also Manual: p. 5-15.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 174-175. This amendment established the National Guard of the United States, consisting of federally recognized National Guard units which had been specifically admitted into it. This amendment also recognized an additional part of the National Guard, that being the National Guard of the several states, which consisted of the National Guard units and personnel (e.g., the adjutants general and their state staffs, and units not selected for federal recognition) not admitted into the National Guard of the United States.

¹⁹Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Sol Gordon, exec. ed. 1984 National Guard Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Lee A. Sharff, 1984): p. 58. (Cited hereafter as Almanac.)

²⁰Militia: p. 201. For a full discussion of these arguments and a summation of the Gray Board's recommendations, see "The National Guard...What of its Future?", The National Guardsman 2 (April, 1948): pp. 4-9.

²¹U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1984: Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 8 June 1983, p. 365. (Cited hereafter as Hearings.) Congressman Whitten

was observing the subcommittee hearings that day, and was not scheduled to appear as a witness. Though not a member of the subcommittee, Congressman Whitten made his remarks as the chairman of the House Committee for Appropriations.

²²Ibid., p. 366.

²³Ibid., p. 410.

²⁴National Guard Bureau, 1983 Annual Review (Washington, D.C.: National Guard Bureau, 1983): p. 35. (Cited hereafter as 1983 Review.)

²⁵Hearings: p. 370. The Total Force policy codified the reforms begun under the Total Force concept in 1970.

²⁶A related issue concerns what the states do to fill the void left by Army National Guard units activated for federal service. Though beyond the scope of this study, this topic is also relevant and must be dealt with by force planners. In an excellent article published in the September 1984 issue of Military Review, "State Defense Forces: The Missing Link in National Security," George J. Stein explores the various legal options left open to the states to form a Home Guard or a State Guard.

²⁷Manual: p. 6-2.

²⁸U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Stephen J. Solarz, House of Representatives: Information on Military Technician Conversions to Full-Time Active Duty Guard and Reserve (8 September 1982): Appendix I, p. 2. (Cited hereafter as Conversions.)

²⁹Almanac: pp. 60-62. Some MTs (e.g., comptrollers and public affairs officers) were not granted full civil service status, but remained state employees. Under the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-486), ARNG MTs are required to be members of the units they work in (Conversions: App I, p. 2).

³⁰When the program began, some MT positions were exchanged one-for-one for AGR slots. However, this system was not continued. After June 1980, units identified as needing additional full-time support were authorized additional positions, either Active Guard/Reserve or Full-Time Support, in addition to their authorized MT positions. The current system includes provisions for both one-for-one swaps and for additional authorizations. In 1982, at the request of Representative Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat from New York, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an investigation into the conversion process. In its report, issued 8 September 1982, the GAO summarized a key concern a number of the representatives on the House Committee on

Appropriations expressed about the FTM program: "The Army now proposes almost 5,900 more conversions, and increases of almost 25,000 in the number [of AGR] personnel over the next 5 years. However, the Army is not sure if these proposals will improve [the reserve component's] readiness." (Conversions: p. 1).

³¹U.S. Department of the Army. Army Regulation 135-2, w/ interim change, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Full Time Manning (1 March 1982): para 6b and 6c. (Cited hereafter as AR 135-2.)

³²Ibid., para 7d.

³³Ibid., para 7e. An exception is that active component (AC) personnel (including Regular Army personnel and reservists on extended active duty) in the FTM program "are not authorized to take part in any State-ordered periods of active duty, if, by so doing, they would violate the 'Posse Comitatus' Act. (See 10 USC 1285)" (Ibid., para 7g). AR 135-2 applies to the ARNG FTM personnel authorized under Section 502(f), Title 32, United States Code, as well as to USAR FTM personnel authorized under Section 672(d), Title 10, U.S. Code.

³⁴Ibid., para 4. FTS personnel are civilians employed in support of the FTM program. These individuals are either status quo technicians (civilians hired under earlier full-time support programs and retained under their prior contractual agreements) or civil service personnel.

³⁵AR 135-2, w/ c1, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Full Time Manning (1 March 1982), and AR 135-18, Active Duty and Full-Time Duty in Support of the Army National Guard, Army National Guard of the United States, and the US Army Reserve (1 April 1984) are the governing regulations concerning FTM support. As valuable as the FTM program is, there are still some drawbacks to it as it is currently configured. For instance, it is possible to have FTM personnel in several categories (e.g., AGR, FTS, or AC) working in the same unit at the same time. These individuals all work for the same person--the unit commander--during weekend Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and summertime Annual Training (AT), but each may work for a different supervisor during the week. Usually this problem is worked out with a gentleman's agreement between the different supervisors, but the potential for conflicting demands, priorities, and loyalties certainly exists. Another problem area is that the AGR category of FTM personnel is creating an elite within the RC due to some of the special provisions that relate to this category, such as requirements to attend resident training, authorization for full-time active Army commissary and medical privileges, and higher pay than some of the other FTM personnel categories for similar positions.

³⁶Report: p. 85.

³⁷AR 135-2: para 8e.

³⁸ARNG units pool much of their equipment at Annual Training sites, for common use by all ARNG units that train with that type of equipment at each site. Since the ARNG units are equipped generally in accordance with active Army MTOEs, this limits the amount of equipment remaining at the unit armories for IDT training.

³⁹U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 11-30, CAPSTONE Program (1 October 1983). In addition to being designated as Roundout units, units may be classified as Affiliated units (augmentation units) or as Mobilization and Deployment Capability Improvement (MDCI) units (aligned for training purposes only).

⁴⁰Staff Sergeant Thomas F. Doherty, "Reversal of Roles: Guard Commands," National Guard 36 (February 1982): p. 11. See also in this issue "Reserve Forces are No Longer in Reserve," pp. 20-23, an interview with Dr. Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

⁴¹Major General (Ret.) William E. Ingram, "Guardsmen Must be Professional Soldiers," National Guard 38 (November 1984): p. 1.

⁴²Lieutenant General (Ret.) Arthur S. Collins, Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1975): p. 191.

⁴³Some of the factors that contributed to the unfavorable impressions of the ARNG in the 1970s were the fact that the ARNG was not called up on a large scale during the Vietnam war, and the ARNG's handling of the 1967 disturbances in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan, and the 1970 disturbance at Kent State University. Additionally, the equipment in ARNG units perennially was hand-me-down equipment from the active Army, giving the ARNG the apparent status of a second class organization. For a fairly comprehensive, albeit unfavorable, view of the National Guard during this period, see Colonel (Ret.) George Walton's book, The Tarnished Shield (A Report on Today's Army) (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.: 1973).

⁴⁴Investment: p. 183.

⁴⁵Colonel (Ret.) Irving Heymont, "Reserves Face Training Constraints," Military Review 65 (February 1985): pp. 75-76.

CHAPTER THREE: HOW WE TRAIN OFFICERS

The Army's keystone training regulation, AR 350-1, Army Training, states: "The Army's ONLY training goal is to develop a combat ready force which is physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win global war."¹ Furthermore, it states the objective of reserve components (RC) training is to "attain the highest possible state of individual and collective proficiency that can be achieved in a premobilization training environment."² With these guidelines in mind, this chapter will discuss the officer individual training system in the Total Army, and then will focus on Army National Guard-specific officer training.

TOTAL ARMY OFFICER INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

AR 350-1, Army Training, recognizes "that RC units cannot, realistically, complete as much training in the same calendar year as Active Army units."³ However, the Army training system as described in AR 350-1, and as modified by the appropriate additional Army and National Guard regulations, remains oriented on preparing "units that know how to, can, and will deploy, fight, and win."⁴ All training must, therefore, relate to preparing the Army for global war, and the Army

training standards and goals apply across the board to all officers in the Total Army.⁵

The Army begins its officers' military training in its various precommissioning programs. This training is based on an approved Headquarters, U. S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) program of instruction (POI).⁶ This POI is a building block in a relatively new system of officer training called the Military Qualifications Standards program. The Military Qualification Standards (MQS) program was initiated as a result of the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study, conducted between August, 1977, and June, 1978. The RETO study found that the officer training system was generally ineffective in preparing officers for their assignments.⁷

The MQS program is designed to establish uniformity among the various officer training programs and schools. The MQS program is a series of tasks, developed for all officer specialties, with supporting manuals, training programs, and certification instruments (tests), and is applied to three levels of training and certification. MQS [level] I deals with precommissioning; MQS II deals with lieutenants' training; and MQS III deals with captains' training. MQS I was fully implemented in all precommissioning programs by January 1984; MQS II and MQS III are currently undergoing staffing and pilot programs, with a tentative implementation date of June, 1986, for both levels. The overall objective of the MQS program is to better prepare officers for their next series of assignments.⁸

After commissioning, Army officers continue their military education and training, which, according to FM 25-2, Unit Training Management,

consists of numerous schools and courses, usually linked to grade and time in service. Leader training in units prepares officers for present and future assignments and complements their formal military education.¹⁰

The officers' initial post-commissioning schooling is usually the branch officer basic course (OBC). Active duty officers attend the basic course "as soon as possible after entry on active duty," and ARNG officers attend "as prescribed by the CNGB [Chief of the National Guard Bureau]."¹¹

According to The Department of the Army Manual, "The basic course prepares the officer for his first duty assignments at the company/battery level."¹¹ According to General William R. Richardson, Commanding General, TRADOC, the objective of today's OBC is to "produce a junior leader capable of immediately taking charge of his unit on arrival and knowing exactly how to train that unit for its wartime mission the very next day."¹² The specifics of the armor officer and armored cavalry officer basic courses will be given later in this chapter.

The next step in formal training (schooling) for officers is the branch officer advanced course (OAC). The OAC provides leadership and branch-specific training for first lieutenants and captains.¹³ According to The Department of the Army Manual: "The advance[d] course prepares the officer[s] to be tactically and administratively competent

company/battery commanders and provides introduction to the duties required of battalion and brigade staff officers."¹⁴ The instruction in today's combat arms OACs emphasizes hands-on training. According to General Richardson, the combat arms OAC's objective is "to develop the finest young tacticians the Army has ever had."¹⁵

Basically, precommissioning military training, the OBC, the OAC, and leader training in units (discussed later in this chapter) constitute individual officer training through the grade of captain. The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) is a required course for AC officers (based on a date of rank criteria); select ARNG officers also attend.¹⁶ However, according to General Richardson, the CAS³ "does not now play a significant role in the professional development of Reserve Component Officers"¹⁷ (emphasis mine); thus, it will not be discussed in this study.

ACTIVE ARMY ARMORED CAVALRY OFFICER TRAINING

The armor officer basic courses (AOBCs) and the armor officer advanced courses (AOACs) are conducted at the Armor Center and School, Ft. Knox, Kentucky. AOBC students follow one of two tracks: Armor or Armored Cavalry; the AOAC is not tracked.

The purpose of the armored cavalry-specific AOBC, as stated in the preface to the program of instruction (POI), is

To prepare newly commissioned officers for their first duty assignment with emphasis on systems specific cavalry

leader skills, to perform as a platoon leader of cavalry units, and to acquire basic administrative, executive skills and knowledges needed to advance beyond platoon level assignments. Specialty for which trained: Cavalry Platoon Leader (12C3C).¹⁸

The armor-specific AOBC's purpose statement has the same wording, except "tank" replaces "cavalry", and the specialty for which trained is "Tank Platoon Leader (12B3C)."¹⁹

A specialty skill identifier (SSI) of either 12B (armor) or 12C (armored cavalry) with an additional skill identifier of 3C (indicating that the officer was trained on the M60-series tank) is awarded to each officer upon successful completion of the AOBC. To the extent possible, this SSI and ASI combination is used to determine the type of unit to which an officer is assigned.²⁰

The armor-specific AOBC's length is 15 weeks; the armored cavalry-specific AOBC's length is 16 weeks. The instruction is divided (in hourly blocks) as indicated below:

<u>HOURS</u>	<u>ARMOR/ARMORED CAVALRY</u>	<u>SUBJECT AREA</u>
360/451		Command and Staff
219/230		Weapons (tank weapons systems and tank gunnery tables)
70/85		Maintenance
88/88		Training and Doctrine
66/69		Committee Instruction (communications and map reading)
33/33		School Brigade (inspections and orientations)
*1/1		ARNG Branch Orientation
836/957	TOTAL	

NOTE: "*" Indicates instruction not counted in the armor-specific AOBC POI's total hours.²¹

The additional training week in the armored cavalry-specific AOBC is primarily used for training on the M3 cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) and the M113 armored personnel carrier (APC), and for other armored cavalry-specific training. The largest single increase in training time over the armor-specific AOBC is an additional 82 hours of mounted tactical training.²²

Upon graduation, the officers go to their initial assignment and begin their "leader training in units." In other words, they begin practicing and refining the leadership skills they learned in precommissioning training and in the AOBC, through daily application in accordance with the training plan of their headquarters.

If present plans for MQS II are approved, an additional phase of leader training—a post-resident phase of Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) instruction—will be required in the near future. Under the MQS II conceptual plan, approximately 15% of the MQS II required training will be in the post-resident ACCP phase, and certification of this training will be tracked through the officer efficiency report (OER) system. Additionally, eligibility requirements for promotion to captain will include successful completion of this in-unit ACCP training.²³

The next step in an active Army armor officer's training is the Armor Officer Advanced Course (AOAC). Active Army officers normally attend the advanced course as soon as practical after promotion to

captain, or as soon as possible after completing 4 years of commissioned service."²⁴

The length of the AOAC is 20 weeks; unlike the ACBC, the course is not limited to armor branch students, but is also open to selected infantry, artillery, engineer, and U.S. Marine Corps officers. The purpose of the AOAC is to "prepare combat arms officers to command armor and other combined arms units at company level and to serve in staff positions primarily at battalion and brigade level."²⁵ The course, divided as follows, was revised in January, 1985, to accomodate certain portions of the test MQS III program.

<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SUBJECT AREA</u>
57	Maintenance
675	Command and Staff
77	Weapons
10	School Brigade
90	Training and Doctrine
38	Committee Instruction
947	TOTAL ²⁶

Even though it is not uncommon to have non-AOAC graduates commanding company-level units in the active Army, the AOAC is the course that is designed to prepare an armor officer for company-level command (as well as for intermediate-level staff positions).

In addition to the military training detailed above, AR 351-1 states that the minimum civilian educational goal for commissioned officers is "to attain an undergraduate degree," and they are also "encouraged to get a graduate degree."²⁷

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ARMOR OFFICER TRAINING

From January through March, 1984, HQ, TRADOC, conducted a study of reserve components training. The results of this study, coupled with additional taskings from Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Maxwell R. Thurman, formed the basis for the Action Plan for Reserve Component Training, distributed to the field on 6 August 1984.²⁸ This plan has dramatically affected RC officer individual training in the officer basic course (OBC) and in the officer advanced course (OAC).

Previously, there were three options available to RC officers to fulfill their requirement to complete the OBC. They could: attend the regular AC resident course, usually 8-14 weeks long; attend the RC OBC, either 2 or 4 weeks long; or complete the Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), an average of 295 credit hours.²⁹

However, major changes to the RC OBC system began in April, 1984, with a message from HQ, Department of the Army (DA), to the major subordinate commands. Key portions of the message include the following:

1. Soldiers in the Total Army force deserve competent leaders. A return to mandatory resident initial skill qualification training will enhance the abilities of our junior officers to perform their assigned duties.
2. Effective 1 April 1984, all newly commissioned ARNG and USAR basic branch lieutenants must complete a resident officer basic course (OBC) to be educationally qualified for promotion to first lieutenant....

B. It is desired that all OCS [officer candidate school] graduates attend IN [Infantry] resident OBC. However, select OCS graduates with approval of the state AG/OCAR [Adjutant General/Office of the Chief, Army Reserve] may attend a Reserve Component (RC) resident course of no less than 8 weeks....

4. Basic branch second lieutenants appointed prior to 1 Apr 84 who are not SSI qualified must complete a resident OBC to be educationally qualified for captain. Officers are encouraged to attend the AC resident [OBC] but may complete a RC resident OBC....

5. Policy options are under consideration by Department of the Army to require a resident training experience for all RC officers during their company grade years to be educationally qualified for promotion to major....

6. ...[The RC resident OBC] will consist of 3 phases:
Phase I Preparatory correspondence course.
Phase II Resident training (minimum 8 wks active duty)
Phase III Take-home package*

This message was modified by General Richardson in an 11 June 1984 message which included the tasking that the Armor Center (along with other designated branch centers) "bring 8 week RC - OBC on line by 30 May 85."**

The impact of these changes is apparent in the revised AOBC for RC armor officers. First, the course length for the AOBC increased from 4 to 8 weeks (beginning in February, 1985). Moreover, the revised AOBC POI includes a requirement for add-on correspondence courses.**

The composition of the present Armor Officer Basic Course for reserve components officers is as follows:

<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SUBJECT AREA</u>
313	Command and Staff
149	Weapons
89	Committee Group Instruction
31	School Brigade/Armor Center
28	Maintenance
610	TOTAL ³³

The purpose of the RC AOBC is "To qualify newly commissioned Reserve component officers in Armor Branch (SC [Specialty Code] 12) and to prepare the officers to perform the duties of an Armor platoon leader."³⁴ Obvious differences between this purpose statement and those given for the AC AOBCs include the lack of any references to "systems specific" training or the acquisition of those "skills and knowledges needed to advance beyond platoon level assignments."³⁵

The fact is that the training in the RC AOBC is not systems specific. The training is presently conducted almost exclusively on M60A3 tanks, with only 4 hours dedicated to the older M60A1 tank fire control systems.³⁶ However, many ARNG armor units do not have either of these tank types; rather, they are equipped with either M60 or M48A5 tanks, which have fire control systems similar to that of the M60A1, but which differ significantly from the M60A3.³⁷

The reduced time for the RC AOBC course eliminates any training beyond that for platoon-level assignments, as well as much training that is needed for tank platoon leaders. As currently structured, the RC AOBC also includes no armored cavalry-specific training. For example, the POI includes no instruction on armored cavalry vehicles or

fundamental armored cavalry tactics. However, the emphasis on hands-on training remains, as the POI does include the same 182 hours of mounted tactical instruction given to the AC AOBC students.³⁸

In order to accomplish the training required but not given during the resident phase, an additional 62 credit hours of the ACCP have been added to the RC AOBC POI. Upon completion of this post-resident instruction, officers will be awarded the SSI 12A (Armor Officer, General).³⁹

In actions similar to those taken to change the RC OBC, the Army also changed the RC OAC structure. A routine message dated 6 November 1984 modified the previously issued Reserve Component Training Action Plan by totally eliminating the option for completing the OAC solely through the ACCP. The three remaining valid options were: attending an active component (AC) regular OAC; attending a full length RC resident OAC; or completing a six-phase RC combination resident and ACCP OAC. The latter is actually conducted in three phases: a pre-resident ACCP phase; a resident phase, conducted in one, two, or three two-week increments, either at the branch school or at a USAR school; and a post-resident ACCP phase. The "six-phase" title refers to the specific types of instruction to be presented, a discussion of which is not relevant to this study.⁴⁰

At the Armor School, the course length for the full-length resident RC AOAC remained at 12 weeks.⁴¹ The purpose of this course is the same as that of the AC AOAC: to prepare combat arms officers to command at

company level and to serve on battalion and brigade staffs.⁴² The composition of the course is as follows:

<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
405	Command, Staff, and Doctrine
24	Weapons
6	Committee Group Instruction
4	School Brigade/Armor Center
52	Maintenance
8	Total Army Briefings
499	TOTAL ⁴³

A proposal has been made to TRADOC to add a post-resident ACCP phase to RC resident OACs (including the RC AOAC). If approved, this would enable a restructuring of current curriculums to allow more hands-on training than is presently possible during the resident phase of the OACs. The proposed phase is to be identical to one of the phases of the six-phase program, to allow students to easily change from one program to the other.⁴⁴

The differences between the RC AOAC and the AC AOAC are vast. In the 8-week time differential, the AC AOAC is able to go into greater detail in almost every area of the curriculum. Some instruction in the AC course would be of questionable value in the RC course, including 1-hour blocks of instruction on the Canadian Army, the German Army, the British Army, the French Army, the Italian Army, the Australian Army, and the U.S. Marine Corps. However, the major difference is that there is significantly less field time in the RC AOAC than in the AC AOAC--52 hours of tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) and action drills in

the former versus 167 hours of TEWTs, action drills, and command post exercises (CPXs) in the latter.⁶³ The RC AOAC does include 59 hours of armored cavalry-specific training, which is a significant improvement for armored cavalry officers over the RC AOBC.⁶⁴

ARNG TRAINING TIME

National Guard Regulation (NGR) 350-1, Army National Guard Training, directs that all federally recognized ARNG units conduct not less than 48 paid unit training assemblies (UTAs) and a minimum of 15 days of Annual Training (AT) per year.⁶⁵ A unit training assembly (UTA) is a period of not less than four hours of inactive duty training (IDT).⁶⁶ The ARNG "training day" often referred to is actually a Multiple Unit Training Assembly (MUTA)-2, or two combined UTAs.⁶⁷ Many units conduct IDT on a Saturday and a Sunday of the same weekend, generally once a month, thus performing two MUTA-2s (or 4 UTAs) 12 times per year.

Additional training time can be granted to both units and individuals for various reasons and is controlled in a number of different categories. These additional training authorizations are limited, primarily due to budgetary considerations. The additional training time authorization categories this study will consider include additional training assemblies (ATAs), which are used to support training or to conduct specialized training, and full-time training duty

(FTTD), which is used for AT, attendance at Army service schools, or participation in exercises or similar duty.⁵⁰

ATAs are authorized to allow "selected personnel to conduct specific training programs, prepare for training, and perform staff supervision of unit training and readiness."⁵¹ However, the only authorized use at company-level is to prepare for training, and the number of ATAs available for use is restricted by NGB-authorized unit allocations and a limit of 12 ATAs per individual per year.⁵² Thus, although ATAs are available for use at the company-level, the restrictions limit their use by company-level commanders.

FTTD is authorized for "AT, attendance at Army service schools, participation in small arms competition, attendance at military conferences, and short tours of active duty for special projects: e.g., retention, ferrying of aircraft, and participation in exercises or other similar duty," and may be performed with pay or without pay.⁵³ FTTD is the category of additional authorized training time that is most frequently used for officer-specific training in units.

The ARNG training system is based on the guidance given for active Army training in FM 25-2, Unit Training Management and FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, as modified by guidance given under the authority of the state adjutants general (AGs).⁵⁴ This guidance varies from state to state, but the research for this study indicates that, generally, it closely follows the active Army guidance.

The training tasks for ARNG units are developed from their CAPSTONE

headquarters' missions, from the appropriate Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), and from directives from their state chain of command.⁵⁵ ARTEP 17-55, The Armored Cavalry Squadron establishes the "combat critical tasks, realistic battlefield conditions, and minimum standards of performance" for regimental armored cavalry squadrons.⁵⁶

Based on the above discussion, one might assume that the Army National Guard's and the active Army's mission-oriented training would be similarly conducted. However, this is often not the case, especially where leader training is concerned.

FM 25-2, Unit Training Management, says that formal military schooling is complemented by leader training in units,⁵⁷ and describes leader training as follows:

Leader training is based on what leaders, soldiers, and units will do in war and how they will do it. It develops a leader's ability to train and to lead. A unit's leader-training program prepares leaders to perform their leadership tasks, employ their units, and make decisions....

TEWTs [Tactical Exercises Without Troops], CPXs [Command Post Exercises], and FTXs [Field Training Exercises] are good performance-oriented techniques for training leaders. Other techniques include developing and practicing the following hands-on leadership skills:

- Conducting physical training (PT).
- Performing inspections.
- Leading dismounted drills.
- Coaching and critiquing on-the-job performance.
- Presenting classroom instruction.
- Studying independently.⁵⁸

FM 25-2 also refers frequently to multi-echelon training when it discusses leader training.⁵⁹ Multi-echelon training—training leaders, crews, and individuals at the same time—is not easy to orchestrate in

the active Army under training conditions that are much more favorable than those found in the ARNG. Consider, then, two of the three squadrons used as the sample population for the data presented in Chapter 4: In one squadron, the squadron headquarters and the tank company are located in the same town, and share the same armory. The closest armored cavalry troop armory is 150 miles away, and the next nearest armored cavalry troop armory is an additional 90 miles away. The four company-level maneuver units in this squadron operate from a total of 8 different armories. In the second squadron, similar circumstances exist--the circuit drive from one armory to all the other armories in this squadron is 360 miles.⁶⁰ The physical separation in these two squadrons—not an uncommon situation—poses a great hindrance to effective multi-echelon, including leader, training.

Perhaps the greatest difference in training between the active Army and the ARNG, however, is the amount of time that can be effectively used to train. The authorized 15 days for AT, plus 48 UTAs (24 days) for IDT, are not enough time to accomplish most of FM 25-2's recommended training exercises even once per year. In practice, it takes at least one full day of a drill weekend to conduct a leader training exercise. Units can use ATAs or, if the training is appropriate, FTTD funds to conduct leader training, but the demands on the leaders' time must be kept to a reasonable level. It is not reasonable to expect any leader to spend one-half of his available training time away from his unit. Nor is it reasonable to expect him to willingly give up much additional

personal and family time to be trained in what is, usually, his second profession. Excessive time demands on ARNG officers may force them to choose between their primary (civilian) and their part-time (ARNG) careers.

TRAINING PROBLEMS

RC-specific training problems, including restricted training time, have been addressed by many people. For example, Major Sherwood E. Ash discussed RC training problems in his 1982 Master of Military Art and Science dissertation, THE TRAINING ASPECT OF RESERVE BATTALION COMBAT READINESS: Can the training system be reoriented to produce combat ready early-deploying (D+30) units?¹ After discussing several proposals for modification of the present training system, as well as discussing other proposed systems, Major Ash summarized his work as follows:

When I first began this study, I believed that substantial improvements could be made within the existing system. Improvements in training readiness can only be obtained by increases in training time or training quality. Unit training quality is being improved, but [not to an acceptable level]. Therefore, any further improvements in unit readiness must be attained by increases in training time....I have come to the [conclusion that the] Department of Defense must have the capability to mandate increases in peacetime training for early-deploying RC units.²

Subsequent events show that Major Ash was not alone in believing that there was a need for increases in peacetime RC training

authorizations. In 1982, in testimony before Congress, Harry N. Walters, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, stated that

improvements to accelerate and enhance the readiness of [selected Reserve Component units include:] providing full-time NCOs down to company level; increased funding for selected units for three weeks (21 days) Annual Training; additional JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) exercise participations; [additional training days authorization] for staffs to conduct command post exercises with CAPSTONE associates; and an additional 15 days of counterpart training for key personnel.⁶³

The additional training time authorizations cited by Mr. Walters support the conclusion that the authorized 39 days of training time are not adequate, by themselves, to allow an ARNG unit to properly prepare for major training exercises. It must follow, therefore, that this time also is not adequate for ARNG units to prepare for war or to conduct leader training in units, the latter problem compounded by the already difficult practice of conducting leader training as part of multi-echelon training.

In their article, "The Reserve Component Dilemma: Mission Versus Time," Colonel (Ret.) Benjamin F. Sharp, Jr., and Major Donald B. Skipper also address aspects of the issue of the effect of time constraints on the RC's training ability.⁶⁴ One of their arguments is as follows:

As more resources are directed toward the Reserve components, a theoretical decision point is reached where it becomes no more expensive--indeed it becomes desirable--to expand the Active forces rather than to spend additional resources on the Reserve components.⁶⁵

The authors contend that Congress and the Reserve Forces Policy Board do not believe that we are approaching that point, and that trends of increasing missions, end strength authorizations, and funding for the RC, while holding the active component at (or near) current levels, will continue.⁶² The authors state that the "existence of additional training time [such as the special NTC training periods and FTID authorizations], beyond the legislated 38 or 39 days a year",⁶³ supports their conclusion that, with the increased number of missions and increased importance of the RC, "Successful completion of [all training and planning requirements] requires more training time than can be made available in just 38 or 39 days a year."⁶⁴

One aspect of training time not fully explored in any of the cited discussions was the time-saving value of FTM personnel. In addition to establishing positions for personnel to train full-time, the FTM program is extremely valuable because the FTM personnel perform necessary routine administrative and logistical tasks daily that would otherwise have to be performed during drill time. There is some training value in performing these routine tasks, but, especially for a combat unit, they detract from the more important combat skills training.

Annual Training (AT) presents a different set of circumstances than IDT, but the administrative erosion of training time still occurs. During AT, a unit is able to spend large blocks of time training on its wartime tasks, as a unit, in a field environment, and AT is often the only time a commander can evaluate his unit's wartime task training.

However, the administrative and logistical functions must still be accomplished (just as similar actions must be accomplished for active Army field training). Put very simply, the unit must load out, move to the AT site, draw equipment, and prepare for training before it can actually begin mission-oriented training. After training, outprocessing must be accomplished before the unit clears the AT site. Outprocessing can take at least two, and sometimes four, days, involving, as it does, equipment clean-up and turn-in, range sweeps, and loading for the return to home station. A detailed plan can insure this is a smooth operation, and FTM personnel should be used as much possible, however, the aforementioned nontactical requirements exist, and accomplishing them takes away from the limited AT training time. FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 is very optimistic when it says: "Well trained units will want to spend 10-12 days [of ATI] in the field."

How much training is the average ARNG company-level commander getting during his authorized training time? Professional training for himself (and his platoon leaders) could occur during IDT, but, more likely, this time is spent resolving unanticipated problems, reviewing the work done by his unit's FTM members since the last drill, coordinating with higher and supporting headquarters, or performing any number of other tasks that demand his attention. Only a small portion of what the company-level commander does during IDT fits FM 25-2's description of leader training. The company-level commander can get excellent leader training (and conduct excellent unit training) during

annual training, provided that the AT training plan is well thought-out and based on the unit's CAPSTONE mission and the tasks, conditions, and standards provided in ARTEP 17-55.

SUMMARY

ARNG company-level commanders face the competing demands of unit training and leader training, both to be conducted within a limited, and probably inadequate, authorized training time. Most ARNG units have 15 days authorized for annual training, and 24 days authorized for weekend drills (IDT). More authorized training time is being provided to selected units, and it appears that this trend will continue in the immediate future. The FTM program is one effective method of increasing a unit's available training time, and this program has the additional benefit of providing well-trained personnel in key positions.

The ARNG system of officer training parallels that of the active Army. However, it differs from the active Army system in that the ARNG officers often attend a shorter AOBC and AOAC, and, therefore, do not receive the same quantity of training. Once in the unit, the ARNG officer's training is under the final control of the state AGs; generally, this training is in line with that recommended by the CAPSTONE unit's headquarters. Recent changes to the ARNG officer training system require resident training at an AOBC and at least some resident training at an AOAC, eliminating the possibility of receiving

credit for completing these courses solely through correspondence
courses.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

¹AR 350-1: para 1-5.

²Ibid., para 6-2.

³Ibid., para 6-1.

⁴Ibid., para 2-1.

⁵Ibid.

⁶U.S. Army. HQ, TRADOC, working paper, subject: Review of Education and Training for Officers: Reserve Component Issues (23 March 1981): p. 14. (Cited hereafter as RETO Study.)

⁷ The RETO study group was formed by the Chief of Staff of the Army in August, 1977, to determine officer training and education requirements, compare them with the requirements met by the existing system, and make appropriate recommendations for changes to the existing system. In June, 1978, the study group published its report. Among other things, it found that there was no standard precommissioning curriculum; that lieutenants were poorly trained for their first assignment; that the advanced course was not doing its stated job of preparing officers for command; and that approximately 60 percent of all majors received no formal military training after the advanced course (RETO Study: p. 1).

⁸U.S. Army. Combined Arms Training Activity (CATA-CTI), Fact Sheet, subject: Military Qualification Standards (MQS) (29 January 1985). (Cited hereafter as MQS Fact Sheet.)

⁹U.S. Department of the Army, FM 25-2, Unit Training Management (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984): p. 6. (Cited hereafter as FM 25-2.)

¹⁰U.S. Department of the Army. AR 351-1, Individual Military Education and Training (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 February 1984): para 4-3. (Cited hereafter as AR 351-1.)

¹¹Manual: p. 6-36.

¹²General William R. Richardson, "TRADOC: Army's Source of Well-Trained Soldiers," Army 33 (October 1983): p. 52. (Cited hereafter as Source.)

¹³FM 25-2: p. 6.

¹⁴Manual: p. 6-36.

¹⁵Source: p. 52.

¹⁶AR 351-1: para 4-4.

¹⁷U. S. Army. HQ, TRADOC, Disposition Form, subject: RC Training Action Plan: MACOM comments, with 3 enclosures (28 June 1984): enclosure 3 "White Paper: Reserve Component Training," p. 4. (Cited hereafter as DF, MACOM Comments.) One reason this school does not presently play a greater role in the professional development of RC officers is that the physical facilities for the school are extremely limited, and therefore the CAS⁸ course enrollment is severely restricted. When the additions to Bell Hall, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., are completed (and additional instructors are assigned), the school is expected to grow to from its current enrollment level of 1200 students per year to 4,500 students per year by October, 1986. (Statistics from: Jim Tice, "Enrollment in CAS⁹ Will Grow Quickly," Army Times, 11 February 1985: pp. 1 and 30.)

¹⁸U.S Department of the Army. Armor School, (extract from) Program of Instruction, Armor Officer Basic, M60A3-Cavalry, course number 2-12-C20-12A-M60A3-Cavalry, 4 February 1985: p. 8. (Cited hereafter as POI-AOBC-Cavalry.)

¹⁹U.S. Department of the Army. Armor School, (extract from) Program of Instruction, Armor Officer Basic, M60A3 Tank, course number 2-17-C20-12A-M60A3-Tank, 12 December 1984: p. 7. (Cited hereafter as POI-AOBC-Tank.)

²⁰The governing regulation for commissioned officer specialty codes (SC) is AR 611-101, with 17 changes, Commissioned Officer Specialty Classification System (U.S. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 November 1975). Specialty code 12 special skill identifiers (12A-Armor Officer, General; 12B-Armor Unit Officer; and 12C-Cavalry Officer) are discussed on pages 4-1 and 4-2; additional skill identifier 3C is discussed on page 5-6.

²¹POI-AOBC-Cavalry: pp. 2-8, and POI-AOBC-Tank: pp. 2-7.

²²POI-AOBC-Tank: pp. 2-6, and POI-AOBC-Cavalry: pp. 2-6.

²³MQS Fact Sheet.

²⁴AR 351-1: para 4-3b(a) and (b).

²⁵U.S. Department of the Army. Armor School, (extracts from) Program of Instruction, course number 2-17-C22, Armor Officer Advanced Course, (28 August 1984): p. 7. (Cited hereafter as POI-AOAC.)

²⁶Ibid., pp. 2-6, and information provided verbally by the Office of the Directorate of Training Development, the Armor School (Mrs. Gail Pollock, telephonic interview), 25 February 1985.

²⁷AR 351-1: para 4-1,a(1).

²⁸U.S. Army. HQ, TRADOC, Disposition Form, subject: DA Action Plan for RC Training, with 2 enclosures (2 August, 1984): enclosure 2, Letter, subject: DA Action Plan for Reserve Component Training, page 1. (Cited hereafter as DA Action Plan.) Part of the guidance issued by General Thurman was a directive that all reserve components lieutenants attend a resident OBC. He explained this directive to an Armor Conference audience by saying: "I don't believe that you can learn how to fire a Table VIII [tank gunnery Table VIII] on paper with a correspondence course." (General Maxwell R. Thurman, "The Manpower Situation," Armor 95 (July - August 1984): p. 27).

²⁹RETO Study: p. 17.

³⁰U.S. Department of the Army. HQ, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, routine message, subject: New Reserve Component Officer Basic Course (OBC) Policy for Basic Branch Lieutenants (16 April 1984).

³¹U.S. Army. HQ TRADOC, routine message, subject: Reserve Component Officer Basic Course (RC - OBC), (11 June 1984): para 4.

³²U.S. Department of the Army. Armor School, (extracts from) Program of Instruction, course number 2-17-C25, Armor Officer Basic - Reserve Components, (21 December 1984): pp. 1, 3. (Cited hereafter as POI-AOBC-RC.)

³³POI-AOBC-RC: pp. 2-3.

³⁴Ibid., p. 4.

³⁵POI-AOBC-Tank: p. 7.

³⁶POI-AOBC-RC: pp. 2-3.

³⁷The first M60A3 tanks were delivered to a Roundout battalion of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), in July, 1982 (See "First Again--1st/108th, 48th Brigade Readies for NTC," National Guard 37 (October 1983): pp. 29-32). However, the three sample population

squadrons, as well as many other units of the ARNG armor force, are still equipped with the M60 tank, which has a fire control system significantly different from—and less effective than—that of the M60A3 tank. According to a recent article in Army Times, all ARNG tank units will be equipped with either the M60A3 tank or the M1 tank within the next four years (Larry Carney, "Wickham Approves Tank Upgrade for Guard," Army Times (25 March 1985): p. 27). However, until this upgrade occurs, the disparity in training will remain.

³⁰POI-AOBC-RC: pp. 2-3.

³¹Telephonic interview with Mr. John Werkman, Chief, RC Course Configuration Branch, Course Development Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Armor School, 8 March 1985.

³²U.S. Army. HQ, TRADOC, routine message, subject: Officer Advanced Course Qualification for Reserve Component Officers (6 November 1984); paragraphs 2 and 3. (Cited hereafter as Message, Officer Advanced Course.) The Armor School has begun the initial iteration of the new six-phase (actually conducted in three phases) USAR/Armor School RC AOAC, with the first phase taught in 1984, and the final phase to be conducted at Ft. Knox and at Gowen Field, Idaho, in the summer of 1985. (Information from Mr. John Werkman, Telephonic interview, 8 March 1985.)

³³U.S. Department of the Army. Armor School, (extracts from) Program of Instruction, course number 2-17-C26, Armor Officer Advanced Course - Reserve Components (9 July 1983): p. 2. (Cited hereafter as POI-AOAC-RC.)

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 5-9.

³⁶Telephonic interview, Mr. John Werkman, 8 March 1985. See also Message, Officer Advanced Course: para 4.

³⁷POI-AOAC-RC: pp. 5-9, and POI-AOAC: pp. 2-6.

³⁸POI-AOAC-RC: pp. 5-9.

³⁹U.S. Department of the Army, National Guard Regulation 350-1, Army National Guard Training (30 November 1983): para 1-4(a). (Cited hereafter as NGR 350-1.) Exceptions to this directive can be granted by the Chief, National Guard Bureau, but they will not be considered in this study. (See Ibid., para 2-1.)

⁴⁰Ibid., para 1-5(u).

⁵⁰Ibid., table 1-1.

⁵¹Ibid., paragraphs 1-5d and 1-5j.

⁵²Ibid., para 2-11a.

⁵³Ibid., paras 2-11b(3)(a) and 2-11c(6).

⁵⁴Ibid., para 1-5j.

⁵⁵Ibid., para 1-4a.

⁵⁶Ibid., para 1-4a through 1-4c. Also, U.S. Department of the Army, FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component (U.S. Army) Training (17 April 1980): para 2-3a. (Cited hereafter as FORSCOM Reg 350-2.)

⁵⁷U.S. Department of the Army, ARTEP 17-55, The Armored Cavalry Squadron (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 March 1982): p. 1-1. (Cited hereafter as ARTEP 17-55.)

⁵⁸FM 25-2: p. 6.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 12.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 8, 32, and 34.

⁶¹Interviews with two squadron training officers, 24 December 1984 and 10 February 1985.

⁶²Major Sherwood E. Ash, THE TRAINING ASPECT OF RESERVE BATTALION COMBAT READINESS: Can the training system be reoriented to produce combat ready early-deploying (D+30) units? (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982).

⁶³Ibid., p. 56.

⁶⁴U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 97th Congress, 2nd sess., 1982, CIS H201-35, p. 177.

⁶⁵Colonel (Ret.) Benjamin F. Sharp, Jr., and Major Donald B. Skipper, "The Reserve Component Dilemma: Mission Versus Time," Military Review 64 (November 1984): pp.62-79.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 63.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 73.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 70.

"FORSCOM Reg 350-2: para 2-5e(4). One training detractor which occurs in all ARNG units of which I have personal knowledge is the "holiday" given during AT. This holiday usually comes during the week at the end of the scheduled field training time and appears to be an important part of the units' retention programs. However, this one- or two-day break in AT training does not appear to be in accordance with the spirit of the changes or the proposed changes in the ARNG training system discussed in the first three chapters of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR: COMMANDER TRAINING IN THE ARNG ACRS

According to AR 350-1, Army Training, "Training will be the top priority for all commanders."¹ This chapter will examine the effectiveness of the Army officer training system in preparing ARNG company-level commanders in the ACRs to accomplish this "top priority." Having previously developed an appreciation for the training environment and the general training requirements for company-grade armor officers, this study will now focus on the sample population of company-level commanders. It will compare the training that they have received to the training required, and will examine their units' use of selected training assistance programs designed to enhance unit training.

To remain unclassified, this discussion will be limited to missions common to armored cavalry units, including the three subject squadrons, configured under the H-series TOEs. ARTEP 17-55, The Armored Cavalry Squadron, is the source document for these missions and their related tasks, conditions, and standards.

The first question this chapter must answer is: "What is (are) the training mission(s) of the sample population ARNG ACR troop and company commanders?" The first part of the answer to this question comes from the stated training mission for ARNG units. National Guard Regulation 350-1, Army National Guard Training, contains the following mission

statement:

Units of the Army National Guard have a dual mission as follows:

a. Federal or State. To provide units organized, equipped, and trained to function efficiently at existing strength in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety under competent orders of Federal or State authorities.

b. Federal. To provide units with qualified individuals for active service in time of war or national emergency in support of the Army's war plans and at such times as the national security may require augmentation of the active forces.²

This study is concerned only with the ARNG's preparation for its wartime mission. However, the dual mission must be recognized, as it has a significant impact on training planning in the ARNG.

The training objective for RC units, according to AR 350-1 Army Training, is to "attain the highest possible state of individual and collective proficiency that can be achieved in a premobilization training environment."³ In the ARNG, as in the active Army, company-level commanders are the primary trainers in their units; as such, they prepare, execute, and supervise the training in and of their units.⁴ Thus, the subjects of this study, the three tank company and nine armored cavalry troop commanders, have the primary responsibility for training their units to support the Army's war plans, from mobilization through commitment on the battlefield. The exact level of training required is related to each unit's priority for commitment, but, as discussed in Chapter One, no ARNG unit can afford to wait until mobilization to train for its wartime mission; all ARNG units must

strive to be as ready as possible, as soon as possible.

In order for commanders to accomplish their "top priority" training mission, they themselves must be trained and must use the training assistance available to increase the effectiveness of their limited training time. The criteria used in this study to determine the extent of the commanders' training are their military education, their level of experience, and the mission training they have done, as commanders, based on the missions in ARTEP 17-55.

The discussion of the extent of the commanders' use of external training resources considers those external teams and programs available to the commanders that could have a direct and positive impact both on the commanders' personal training and their units' training. All uses of external resources cited in interviews with ARNG ACR personnel have been categorized, except for the use of training support (training aids, films, etc.). The use of training support was not considered in this study.

The objective of this study, as stated in Chapter One, is to examine the professional training, including schooling, of the twelve ARNG ACR company-level commanders selected as the sample population, in terms of what they have done, what they are required to do, and how well their personal training has prepared them for their training and wartime missions. To gather relevant data, a series of three interviews was conducted in December, 1984, and February, 1985. The time period covered by the survey was from 1 January 1984 to 31 December 1984. The

twelve company-level commanders selected for the study are the tank company commanders and armored cavalry troop commanders of three ARNG armored cavalry squadrons from different ACRs and different states.

The three interviews were conducted with the training officers from the three armored cavalry squadrons. All are FTM personnel and have been in the position of squadron training officer for longer than two years. Their weekend duty positions in the units are different: one is the squadron executive officer, one is the squadron S-3, and one is the squadron S-3 (Air).

The three officers interviewed were informed, in advance, of the general types of questions that would be asked and of the fact that the orientation of the interview would be on the squadrons' armored cavalry troop and tank company commanders. The officers interviewed were assured that the information they provided would not be directly attributed to them, and was to be used only to build a body of data. All three officers volunteered to be interviewed.

The twelve sample population company-level commanders have been assigned a random number from 1 to 12; the same random number has also been assigned to their unit. This random number is used to identify this commander and/or his unit in the charts presented in this chapter. Numbers 8, 9, and 12 are tank company commanders/companies; the remaining numbers are armored cavalry troop commanders/troops. It is important to make this distinction, as the ARTEP missions of reconnaissance and security are not applicable to the tank companies.

Although the aforementioned random numbers were assigned, Charts 3 through 6 clearly reveal that numbers 1, 4, 7, and 12 constitute one squadron, numbers 2, 5, 9, and 10 another squadron, and numbers 3, 6, 8, and 11 the final squadron.

Charts 1 and 2 present the military and civilian education and military experience levels of the twelve officers in command as of 31 December 1984. Chart 3 depicts the units' ARTEP mission training and evaluation, by mission, during calendar year 1984. Some of the training and evaluations occurred during AT, and some during IDT. Charts 4, 5, and 6 show the units' use of various external training resources during calendar year 1984. Charts 3 through 6 do not take into account who the actual commander was at a particular time. This is based on the assumption that, had the present commander been in command for the full calendar year, he would have trained and been evaluated on the same ARTEP missions and would have used the external training resources in a like manner.

CHART 1: COMMANDERS' EDUCATION

COMMANDER:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	RMKS
OBC RES	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	Note 1
AOB	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
OTHER										ADA	INF		
OBC NONRES					*								
OAC RES				*		APP	APP	*		*			Note 2
AOAC				*		APP	APP			*			
OTHER										ADA			
OAC NONRES	*			ENR	ENR				ENR			ENR	
BACHELOR DEGREE	*	*						*	*	*	*	*	
ADVANCED DEGREE		ENR							ENR				
UNDGRD		*	*	*	*	*							Note 3

SOURCE: Interviews; see Bibliography.

Abbreviation key: ADA: Air Defense Artillery.
 APP: Application has been submitted.
 AOAC: Armor Officer Advanced Course.
 AOB: Armor Officer Basic Course.
 ENR: Enrolled; completed some credits.
 INF: Infantry.
 NONRES: Nonresident.
 OAC: Officer Advanced Course.
 OBC: Officer Basic Course.
 RES: Resident, either AC or RC course.
 UNDGRD: Some collegiate work; no degree.

Note 1: Attendance required as of 1 April 1984.

Note 2: No requirement currently exists for ARNG officers to attend a purely resident advanced course, although a major purpose of this course is to train company-level commanders.

Note 3: All ARNG officers must have completed a minimum of two years college by 1 October 1989."

Chart 1 depicts the sample population commanders' military and civilian education status. A wide variation in education levels is shown in the chart; no two commanders in the sample group have the same educational background.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the current military educational requirement for promotion to captain is attendance at a resident OBC. Only one commander, commander #4, does not meet the current military educational requirement for promotion to captain.

The grade authorized for company and troop commanders in an armored cavalry squadron is captain. Not shown in the chart, but determined from the interviews, is the fact that all twelve commanders are captains. Therefore all twelve commanders are in the authorized grade for their position.

The civilian education requirement cited in Note 3 was implemented in Fiscal Year (FY) 1983. An additional civilian education requirement added in FY 1984 requires all commissioned officers appointed in the ARNG after 30 September 1983 to have a baccalaureate degree for promotion to major.⁶ Although this does not affect the sample population, this added requirement reflects an effort to improve the quality of the ARNG's officer corps by increasing their civilian education requirements.

Chart 1 shows that, based on the requirements in effect at the time of their promotion to captain, all twelve captains are educationally

qualified for their current rank, and, therefore, are qualified, by grade, to command. Moreover, even prior to the recently added requirement for attendance at a resident OBC, eleven of the twelve sample population company-level commanders had attended a resident OBC.

Based on the sample population, it is reasonable to conclude that a majority of the ARNG ACRs' company-level commanders:

- are in the grade authorized for their position.
- have attended a resident OBC, most likely the AOBC.
- have not attended a resident OAC.
- meet or are working to meet the current civilian education requirements for their current grade, even though this requirement does not apply to them.
- do not meet the increased (and not yet in effect) civilian education requirements for promotion to major.

Not shown in the chart but determined from the interviews was the fact that none of the twelve sample population commanders have attended or are scheduled to attend the CAS³. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that CAS³ does not currently play a significant role in company-level commander training in the ARNG ACRs.

CHART 2: COMMANDERS' EXPERIENCE LEVEL

COMMANDER:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	RMS
MONTHS COMMISSIONED SERVICE	138	125	89	78	161	64	78	61	94	113	113	92	Note 1
MONTHS AS CO-LEVEL COMMANDER	42	48	24	3	48	7	12	24	27	16	6	6	Note 2
MONTHS IN PRESENT COMMAND PSN	6	48	24	3	48	7	12	24	15	16	6	6	
ARTEP AS COMMANDER	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*				
PRIOR ACTIVE DUTY					*		*	*	*				
YEARS ENLISTED						2			.2				
YEARS OFFICER							4		4				
CBT EXPERIENCE						*							
REFORGER AS PLAYER	*								*				
CAPSTONE EXERCISE AS PLAYER	*	*			*		*		*				
OTHER ACTIVE ARMY EXERCISE(S)	(2)K	K	(2)FTX	K	K	(2)FTX		FTX	K				Note 3

SOURCE: Interviews; see Bibliography.

Note 1: Includes all commissioned service, except for time spent in the inactive reserves, where applicable.

Note 2: Includes previous company-level command time, where applicable.

Note 3: Number in parentheses indicates number of exercises. "K" indicates participation in the Key Personnel Update Program (KPUP). "FTX" indicates participation in an active Army FTX as a controller/evaluator, as part of the counterpart training program.

One fact reflected in Chart 2 is the almost total lack of combat experience at the company commander level. I am fairly certain that there is a similar lack of combat experience at the company commander level in the the active Army. However, a common perception is that the ARNG contains a sizeable pool of combat experienced veterans. Based on the sample population, however, it is reasonable to conclude that this is not the case with regard to company-level commanders in the ARNG ACRs.

In all cases, the officers participated in CAPSTONE exercises as players in positions other than those of troop or company commander. Moreover, all of the exercises were CAPSTONE HQ-administered CPXs.

The limited active duty experience and the limited active duty exercise experience of the ARNG commanders, reflected in Chart 2, may indicate that, as a group, they are unfamiliar with the techniques and practices of their active duty counterparts. The Army has recently increased the funding for several of the programs (including the Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP), the counterpart training program, Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) training for RC units, and National Training Center (NTC) training for Roundout units) that allow increased ARNG-active Army interactive training. One vivid example of this is the KPUP funding. In 1980, the KPUP was funded at 3 million dollars; in 1983, this program was funded at 18 million dollars.⁷ As

part of the KPLP, during FY 1984 more than 800 National Guardsmen trained at the NTC.* However, none of the sample population commanders have been trained at the NTC, and according to the interviews, none are scheduled for this or any other type of NTC training.

CHART 3: ARTEP MISSIONS TRAINED/EVALUATED, CY 84

CO/TRP:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
PLAN AND CONTROL CBT OPNS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
MAINTAIN OPSEC	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
PERFORM TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
CONDUCT NBC DEFENSE OPNS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
DEFEND AGAINST AIR ATK	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
CONDUCT SUSTAINING OPNS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
MOVE	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
ATTACK	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
DEFEND	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
CONDUCT RECON OPNS	*	*	*	*	*	*						
CONDUCT SECURITY OPNS	*	*	*	*	*	*						
OPERATE COMMAND POST	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

SOURCE: Interviews, see Bibliography.

NOTES: The list includes only those ARTEP 17-55 missions trained and/or evaluated at the troop/company level; moreover, it does not include supplemental missions.

The missions listed in Chart 3 are the standard tactical missions (less the supplemental missions) for an armored cavalry troop or a regimental tank company, as listed in ARTEP 17-55. Units #8, 9, and 12, the three tank companies, are not responsible for the missions "Conduct Reconnaissance Operations" and "Conduct Security Operations."

The similarity between company-level maneuver units of the same squadron is to be expected, as the yearly training plan is produced at the squadron level. The data presented in Chart 3 simply underscores the fact that the company-level units train on the missions directed by the squadron headquarters.

Of the two squadrons whose units trained or were tested on all of their standard tactical missions, one accomplished this feat during AT. The other squadron trained and tested its units during a combination of IDT and AT. The squadron that accomplished all of its ARTEP training and testing during its CY 84 AT is not going to attempt the same feat during its next AT. According to that squadron's training officer, "There's no way you can train on the whole ARTEP at AT—it's just too much."

Tank gunnery training is not shown in Chart 3. One squadron dedicated a full twenty-five per cent of its available IDT time to tank gunnery training, which severely limited the amount of other necessary training this squadron conducted during IDT. Other training requirements (not shown in Chart 3) also require

substantial amounts of training time, and detract from the time available for ARTEP mission training.

CHART 4: USE OF EXTERNAL RESOURCES: IDT (DRILLS)

COMMANDER:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
SQDN/REGTL ASSISTANCE TEAMS	2	2		3	4		4		2	2		1
BRANCH ASSISTANCE TEAMS	1			3	8		3		6			
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	1	3		1	3		1		1	3		1
REGTL/STATE ADVISORY GRP TEAMS		4			1				1	1		
CAPSTONE HEADQUARTERS BRIEFING			1			1		1			1	
OTHER TRAINING TEAMS	AH		AH									

Source: Interviews; see Bibliography.

NOTES: Numbers indicate frequency of times a team/briefing was used.
 "AH" indicates an ad hoc training team, formed for a specific, one-time training mission.

CHART 5: USE OF EXTERNAL TRAINING SUPPORT: WETS

COMMANDER:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
SQDN/REGTL ASSISTANCE TEAMS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
BRANCH ASSISTANCE TEAMS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	*	*		*				*	*			
REGTL/STATE ADVISORY GRP TEAMS	*			*				*	*			
OTHER TRAINING TEAMS	AH		AH		AH					AH		

Source: Interviews, see Bibliography.

NOTES: "*" indicates routinely used assistance.

"AH" indicates an ad hoc training team, formed for a specific, one-time training mission.

CHART 6: USE OF EXTERNAL TRAINING SUPPORT: AT

COMMANDER:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
SQDN/REGTL ASSISTANCE TEAMS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
BRANCH ASSISTANCE TEAMS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*		*
REGTL/STATE ADVISORY GRP TEAMS	*			*				*	*			
EXTERNAL ARTEP EVALUATION HEADQUARTERS	*	*		*	*	*		*	*			*

Source: Interviews; see Bibliography.

NOTE: "*" indicates use by the unit during CY 84 AT.

Charts 4, 5, and 6 depict the use of external training assistance resources during IDT, WETS and AT. The interviews revealed that no use was made of the following external training resources: National Training Center experience (in any form); CAPSTONE HQ training assistance; attendance at the CAS³; or participation in the Captains-to-Europe program. Therefore, these programs do not appear in the charts.

Based upon the data presented in Charts 4, 5, and 6, it appears that only one squadron's company-level units are using the different advisory groups assigned to the states and regiments. In all three interviews, these advisory groups were credited with providing good assistance and advice to the squadrons at the squadron headquarters level. However, this advisory assistance was not used regularly at the company level, and, therefore, appears limited in the tabulated data.

A similar comment can be made with regard to the CAPSTONE headquarters. Coordination, training guidance, and limited training assistance were provided to the sample population squadrons, but this assistance did not extend to the company level, except in the form of training guidance modified by the intermediate commands, and, as indicated, in the form of a general mission briefing for one squadron's company-level units.

Two of the squadrons have at least one Master Gunner apiece assigned in an FTM position; however, the third squadron has no Master Gunners assigned, in an FTM position or otherwise. The latter

squadron's training officer cited this lack of an assigned Master Gunner as a limiting factor when the subject of the use of squadron/regimental assistance team support was discussed.

Charts 4, 5, and 6, show some other patterns. For example, it is clear that the company-level units of one squadron did not receive any external training assistance, other than the one briefing from their CAPSTONE headquarters, for their drills. According to the squadron's training officer, these units did not request any assistance of this type for their drills due to the past ineffectiveness of some assistance teams. In fact, only one squadron's company-level units appear to have taken full advantage of the available training assistance teams. One might logically question whether most ARNG ACR company-level units (and their commanders) are making the most effective use of their limited available training time.

The charts also reflect that a great deal of squadron, regimental, and branch assistance is requested regularly by all the units when they are required to "do" something (WETS and AT), rather than just "train" (IDT). Based on my personal experience, this practice leads to training on fundamentals at WETS and AT, rather than during IDT. Such training does not make the best use of WETS and AT training sites or the external training resources available, which could be better used for more advanced training.

One interesting note from the interviews is that the three squadron training officers seemed to regard the branch assistance teams more as

range and firing experts than as trainers and training assistants. This attitude may well be a reflection of the attitude the branch assistance teams project.

Based on the data presented in Charts 4, 5, and 6, it is reasonable to conclude that the use of external training assistance resources during IDT varies widely between company-level units in the ARNG ACRs. It is also reasonable to conclude that this use increases across the board during WETS and AT. Finally, it may be concluded that several ARNG ACR company-level units are not making the most effective use of available training resources.

SUMMARY COMMENTS

As might be expected, the level of experience and education varies widely among the sample population company and troop commanders. However, the vast majority of them--eleven of the twelve--have attended a resident OBC; nine of the eleven have attended the AOBC. On the other hand, only three of the twelve have completed the DAC, the course that is designed to prepare them for company-level command, two of the three having completed the resident AOAC. None of the sample population company-level commanders have attended or are scheduled to attend the CAS*. Thus, it is logical to conclude that most of the ARNG ACR company-level commanders have not been resident school-trained for their commands (or for positions on brigade/regiment or higher level staffs).

It appears that the sample population commanders are not making full use of the external training resources available to them during IDT. It follows that, as a consequence of this, the training on fundamentals that could and should have occurred during IDT must be conducted at WETS and AT, rather than the advanced training which makes better use of the WETS and AT resources.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

¹AR 350-1: para 1-7.

²NGR 350-1: para 1-3.

³AR 350-1: para 6-2.

⁴Ibid., para 1-8u(4).

⁵Investment: p. 184.

⁶Ibid. This requirement does not yet appear in the governing promotion regulation: U.S. Department of the Army, AR 135-155, with 5 changes, Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other Than General Officers (1 November 1983).

CHAPTER FIVE:

CONCLUSIONS

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

The ARNG (then the Militia) was originally organized as a primarily state-oriented military force, with the secondary mission of supplementing the federally controlled Army. Developments over the past 200 years have modified the purpose of the ARNG to the extent that, today, the ARNG is a major component of the total deterrent force of the United States. While the ARNG still retains its state mission, current national planning includes ARNG forces among the initial forces to supplement deployed and deploying Army forces in a crisis that requires a rapid expansion of the Army.

The current trend of increasing the missions, funding, and manpower authorizations for the RC, while holding the AC at or near its current levels, is expected to continue in the immediate future. A principal reason for this trend is the apparent economy offered by the RC units compared to similarly equipped and manned AC units.

The increased role of the ARNG in defense planning has led to increased scrutiny and change, or attempted change, of a number of ARNG aspects. The very concept of state control of the nonfederalized ARNG has been modified over the past 200 years, with the federal government

gradually increasing its involvement with and control over the ARNG. The limited (39 days) training time authorized for the ARNG has also been examined recently, and has undergone de facto changes, with special authorizations now being given to high priority units.

INCREASED STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE ARNG

The importance of the ARNG in our nation's deterrent and defensive planning has dramatically increased in recent years. Since the Total Force concept was first announced by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, through the resulting implementation of the Total Force policy with its attendant programs and increased funding for the ARNG, the ARNG has grown to be a full partner in the Total Army. As stated by Major General Temple, "A military force of the size and capability of the Guard serves as one of the world's significant deterrents to war. As the force grows and accomplishes higher levels of training proficiency[,] its deterrent value increases commensurately."¹ The ARNG contains more than one-half of the land combat power of the Total Army, including four of the seven armored cavalry regiments in the Total Army.

The CAPSTONE program, one of the programs generated by the Total Force policy, aligns ARNG units with a wartime headquarters, provides the ARNG with its training orientation, and provides force planners with designated ARNG units as augmentations. The objectives of this program include: improving wartime mission-oriented training; improving

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TOTAL FORCE TRAINING: A STUDY OF COMPANY-LEVEL
COMMANDERS' TRAINING IN AR. (U) ARMY COMMAND AND
GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS L R BARNES

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
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mobilization and wartime planning; and providing a structure that enables units to plan and train in peacetime with the organization they will operate with in wartime.²

Other programs, such as KPUP and counterpart training, are also products of the Total Force policy, and have as their long-range objective an overall increase in RC--and Total Army--readiness. One indicator of the Army's level of commitment to the Total Army policy is the increased level of funding these aforementioned programs have received in the past few years.

TOTAL ARMY COMPANY-LEVEL OFFICER TRAINING

The 1977 RETO study and the 1984 Reserve Component Training Study led to significant changes in the Army's commissioned officer training system. One significant change was the refinement of the AOAC to enable the course to better prepare graduates for company-level command.

Another RETO-generated change was the development and subsequent implementation of the CAS³ course, whose purpose is to provide captains with the skills necessary to perform the duties required of brigade and division staff officers. Attendance at the CAS³ is now mandatory for all active duty captains who meet the date of rank criteria, and is also available to selected RC officers. This course will play a greater role in the professional development of all Army officers in the future, after the needed manpower and facility expansions are completed at Ft.

Leavenworth, KS.

Due to several recent changes inspired by TRADOC's Reserve Component Training Study, all RC officers are now required to attend a resident OBC and at least specified phases of a resident OAC; previous options for completing these courses solely through the ACCP have been eliminated.

A significant modification to the officer training system is the MQS program. The MQS program is an attempt to establish a base level of officer knowledge keyed to rank, across the Total Army. Under this program, all officers, regardless of branch or source of commission, will be trained according to established Army-wide standards. This program currently is partially fielded.

The ARNG is authorized only 39 training days per year--24 IDT training days and 15 AT training days. Some believe that 39 training days per year are not sufficient to allow units to properly prepare for their recently increased missions; the additional training time currently authorized for selected units is cited to support this argument. The majority of ARNG units must work within the authorized 39 days, with only limited additional training time authorized to prepare training (ATAs) or to participate in certain specified types of training (FTTD). This restricted training time adversely affects leader training in units. Moreover, the geographic separation of units common in the ARNG compounds this problem.

ARNG ACR COMPANY-LEVEL COMMANDERS' TRAINING

The ARNG officer training system closely parallels that of the active Army. Active Army armor branch officers, and those RC armor branch officers who choose to do so, attend either the armored cavalry track or the armor track of the active Army AOBC. However, the RC AOBC is not tracked, and includes no armored cavalry-specific instruction in its POI. One significant drawback to the RC AOBC is that the training usually is not conducted on the type tanks and other equipment found in the RC officers' units. However, both the active Army and the RC basic courses stress hands-on training, with the objective of producing sound platoon leaders and trainers. Some AOBC training is completed through a take-home ACCP package. It is reasonable to conclude, based on the data presented in Chapter 4, that many ARNG ACR officers attended a resident basic course, even before the requirement to do so was formalized.

The RC AOAC is approximately eight weeks shorter than the active Army AOAC, including 115 fewer hours of field training time. However, as opposed to the RC AOBC, the RC AOAC contains some armored cavalry-specific training. An optional version of the RC AOAC allows students to attend the course in three phases. This optional version is built around two-week resident block(s) of instruction, with pre-resident and post-resident ACCP packages completing the course work. The initial iteration of the armor version of this optional course will be completed in CY 85.

The AOAC is designed to train officers for ACR company-level command (and other combined arms company-level commands). Since the RC AOBC does not prepare its graduates for assignments higher than tank platoon leader and provides no armored-cavalry specific training, the ARNG ACR company-level commanders should be AOAC graduates. However, based on the data presented in Chapter 4, it is reasonable to conclude that many of the company-level commanders in the ARNG ACR's are not AOAC graduates and, therefore, were not school-trained for their commands.

The company-level commander is the keystone in training ARNG ACR units for rapid mobilization and early commitment. Assigned FTM personnel perform many time-saving functions, and can greatly assist company-level commanders in unit training. In addition, external training assistance from several sources (such as branch assistance teams, advisory groups, and the unit's own higher headquarters) is available to assist the company-level commander in his training mission. To effectively use the limited training time available, company-level commanders should make efficient use of these external training assistance resources. However, the data presented in this study indicates that these external resources are probably not being used at the company level in the ARNG ACRs to the extent they should be.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The eventual impact of the CAS¹ course in the ARNG may be

considerably different from the impact this course will have in the active Army. A proposal to allow substitution of completion of the CAS³ course for completion of fifty per cent of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) course as a requirement for promotion to lieutenant colonel was made in the June, 1984, draft DA Action Plan for RC Training.⁴ General Richardson, in his White Paper RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING (issued the same month) voiced his apparent support for this type of proposal. He stated: "Any course of action adopted must tie CAS³ to the mandatory Reserve officer promotion gates. As a minimum, completion of CAS³ will be required for Captains selected for full-time manning positions."⁵ A different proposal in the final version of this plan indicated that TRADOC would examine the feasibility of a "combined CAS³/CGSC modular package" to determine the optimal course for RC officer training.⁶ This "modular package" might conceivably include a new course which would impact on both the CAS³ and the CGSC. Decisions on these and other CAS³-related proposals will have wide-ranging impacts, and will affect the entire spectrum of ARNG officer training. A study in this area might be able to determine some of the long-term effects of the different CAS³ proposals on the ARNG officer training system, and should also include the impacts on the USAR.

Mobilization was intentionally not addressed in this study. However, mobilization is a significant problem for ARNG units that are not trained and prepared to mobilize, and ineffective mobilization will hinder the execution of war plans. Several sources mentioned that,

because the 15-day AT period resembles the time period available to many units for post-mobilization training, using an AT period in this fashion would provide needed training in this and related areas. Two of the sample population squadrons, independently, considered planning combination mobilization and AT training periods, but were unable to develop these plans because of other training constraints. A study in this area might show whether this type of training could routinely be done; if it could not routinely be done, the study might identify the exceptional requirements which must be met to accomplish a combined mobilization-AT training period.

The topic of competing time demands of the (full-time) civilian and the (part-time) military professions was mentioned or alluded to in many of the sources used for this study. The recently increased requirements for resident military education and the projected future increased requirements in both civilian and military education for RC officers will serve to intensify any existing problem in this area. A study of these requirements could determine the amount of time actually required to satisfy these requirements, and to investigate the probable impacts these increased demands will have on the RC officer corps.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

A major factor in the increased readiness of the ARNG is the FTM program, which is projected to expand dramatically in the near future.

Even though it is recognized as a needed program, the FTM program is not without its drawbacks. Based on the comments of the three squadron training officers interviewed for this study, the discussion presented on the AGR program in Chapter 2, and my personal observations, many of the initial start-up problems with the AGR portion of the FTM program have been resolved. However, much remains to be done in this area, and the projected growth of the FTM program will probably require several significant management changes. A key concern of several FTM personnel interviewed during the course of the research for this study is that the present program does not provide a fair system of compensation; different categories of FTM personnel performing similar tasks may earn significantly different salaries, due to the differences in wage scales between categories. This area has been highlighted in a number of congressional reports, and a major effort to correct this specific problem can be expected in the future.

Some high priority ARNG units are receiving more training time authorizations and/or the latest equipment. For example, within the next 28 months, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter will be issued to the first ARNG aviation unit at the same time it is issued to some active Army units.⁶ The receiving ARNG unit will also be authorized additional training assemblies to train on the AH-64.⁷ Additionally, an ARNG-wide tank fleet upgrade plan has recently been approved by the Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., and by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General John A. Wickham, Jr. Under this plan, all M48A5 and M60A1 tanks

in ARNG units are scheduled to be replaced with M60A3 or M1 tanks in the next four years. The Army's commitment to making the Total Army policy work is evidenced by the aforementioned costly equipment upgrade programs, as well as the development of training assistance programs and increased funding/training time authorizations. A further logical development of the Army's commitment to the Total Army policy would be to increase ARNG officer training requirements. Several recent increases in these requirements have been highlighted by this study; the proposals relating to the CAS³ course, cited earlier, indicate further possible changes.

According to General Richardson, the principal duty of a leader is to prepare for war. In his words,

"That preparation demands that each officer and noncommissioned officer know what he needs to do with his unit to gain peak combat effectiveness. This involves much more than just 'branch qualification'; it includes a broad-based, in-depth understanding of tactics, weapons and equipment; a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of doctrine; and the imagination and ingenuity to effectively apply them."⁴

The emphasis on requiring ARNG officers to attend resident Army schools to gain this "broad-based, in-depth understanding" will continue in the near future. However, this emphasis must be tempered by the knowledge that excessive resident training requirements may force many qualified ARNG officers to choose between their principal civilian employment and their part-time military position.

CONCLUSION

The reserve components have significantly increased in importance in our nation's deterrence and defense plans; today, over fifty percent of the Total Army's land combat power, including four of the seven armored cavalry regiments, is in the reserve components. The company-level commanders are the keystones of training in the ARNG's ACRs. Thus, the training, including schooling, of these company-level commanders is a subject of vital importance because of its significant impact upon the effectiveness of the crucial training conducted by these key commanders.

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES

¹Return: p. 189.

²AR 11-30: para 1b(1)-1b(3).

³DF, MACOM Comments: enclosure 1, "MACOM Responses to Staffing of RC Training Action Plan," p. 10. This proposal was not included in the final version of the action plan; however, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, in comments on the draft plan, indicated that this change would be made to AR 135-155, after the final plan was published (DF, MACOM Comments: enclosure 2, letter, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, subject: Reserve Component Training Action Plan to Improve RC Training, p. 2). As of this date, these changes in AR 135-155 have not been made.

⁴DF, MACOM Comments: enclosure 3, "White Paper: Reserve Component Training," p. 4.

⁵DA Action Plan: Issue 5, action A.

⁶"Army Guard Management Conferences," National Guard 39 (February 1985): p. 30.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Source: p. 79.

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